Appeal 3371408

The appeal is dismissed.

On 16 December 2025, the Government published a consultation on proposed reforms to the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework). Whilst broad changes to the structure of the Framework are proposed as part of this consultation, these proposals could be subject to further change and can only be given very limited weight at this stage. It has therefore not been necessary to consult the parties on the changes, and in reaching my decision, I have had regard to the Framework published in December 2024.

The main issues are: • the effect of the proposed development on highway safety, with particular regard to parking provision; and • whether the need for the proposed development outweighs any harm identified in respect of highway safety.

The appeal property is a two storey terraced dwelling, set back from the highway behind a paved area. The proposal would provide vehicular access between the paved area to the front of the dwelling and the road.

Vehicle parking along [address] is provided within demarcated areas on the pavement. The proposal would result in the loss of access to the demarcated parking area immediately to the front of the appeal property. This would result in the loss of two car parking spaces, which would likely increase the demand for car parking locally, thereby increasing the existing levels of parking stress.

Policy LP23 of the Redbridge Local Plan (2018) (Local Plan) states that where development proposals involve a reduction of existing off-street car parking, the developer will be required to demonstrate that sufficient parking will remain in the area to serve local needs. The Council refer to the Redbridge - Policy for [name] (2023) (PFC), which advises that footway crossings will not be permitted where they would result in the loss of more than one individual space in resident’s parking bays within any zone.

The submitted evidence does not include analysis of the local parking demand. Increased parking demand in instances of limited supply may lead to additional congestion as drivers seek parking spaces, or park illegally, which would be detrimental to highway safety. As the proposal would lead to the loss of two existing parking spaces, there is little to indicate that such effects could be avoided by the appeal proposal.

The PFC requires that 20% of the area in front of the property is provided as soft landscaping. The proposal makes no provision for soft landscaping and therefore does not comply with this requirement. The Council also states that the PFC requires a footway crossing to have a minimum width of 3.6 metres. However, no convincing evidence has been submitted to demonstrate that the proposal’s marginally reduced width of 3.5 metres would result in harm.

I have been referred to the Department for [name] guidance (2021). However, no specific section or paragraph has been identified that is directly relevant to the circumstances of this appeal, and its applicability to the proposal has therefore not been clearly demonstrated.

For the above reasons, I conclude that the proposal would harm highway safety with regard to the adequacy of the parking provision and the potential for the displacement of vehicles on to the public highway. I therefore find that it conflicts with policy LP23 of the Local Plan. Amongst other aspects the policy requires that particular attention be given to highway capacity, parking provision and safety.

There is evidence before me in relation to the personal circumstances of the appellant’s children, including medical conditions. The appellant has also drawn my attention to the Children Act 1989, which appears to relate to consideration of children’s welfare through the courts. Nonetheless, in determining this appeal, I have had due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) contained in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010. This requires me to have due regard to the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, harassment, and victimisation, and to advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not.

Amongst other things, for the purposes of the Equality Act, protected characteristics include disability. [name] have not been provided with supporting medical information, the submitted evidence indicates that an occupational therapist made recommendations for the proposal, and I am satisfied that the purpose of the appeal is to accommodate car parking which would be beneficial for family members who have a protected characteristic for the purposes of applying the PSED.

The personal circumstances and medical conditions of the occupiers of the appeal property mean that they would benefit from being able to park immediately outside their home. I appreciate that being able to park on the frontage would be more convenient and would allow safer access than having to travel to a vehicle parked along the nearby, unrestricted road.

However, it does not follow from the PSED that the appeal should succeed. Dismissing this appeal would prevent the occupiers of the appeal property from having convenient frontage parking which, due to their personal circumstances, could result in additional difficulties for them. I afford this harm moderate weight. Nevertheless, the proposal would cause harm to highway safety with regard to the adequacy of the parking provision and the potential for the displacement of vehicles on to the public highway. I therefore afford this harm considerable weight.

Therefore, while the proposed development may help people who share protected characteristics for the purposes of the PSED, given the evidence before me this would not override the site specific unacceptable harm to highway safety that would result from the proposal. As such, this does not amount to a material consideration of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the primacy of, and conflict found with, the development plan.

The appellant has expressed dissatisfaction with the Council’s handling of the application and indicates that the Council sought to install the dropped kerb under a [name]. Whilst planning permission was not obtained, the appellant indicates that this was due to an internal council administrative failure. However, this is a matter between those parties, and it cannot have any bearing on my determination of this appeal.

The proposal would conflict with the development plan and there are no material considerations that indicate that the decision should be made other than in accordance with it. For the reasons given above and having had regard to all other matters raised, the appeal should be dismissed.