Appeal 6000359

The appeal is dismissed.

An application for costs was made by [name] against the Council. This application is the subject of a separate decision.

Schedule 2, Part 3, Class MA of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (the GPDO) permits development of a change of use of a building and any land within its curtilage from a use falling within Class E (commercial, business and service) of Schedule 2, to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of Schedule 1.

This is subject to a number of situations where such development is not permitted, listed under paragraph MA.1. It is common ground between the parties that the proposed development would meet the requirements of paragraph MA.1 and that, as such, it would represent permitted development.

Development under Class MA of the GPDO is permitted subject to the condition that before beginning the development the developer must apply to the local planning authority for a determination as to whether the prior approval of the authority is required.

[name].2 of the GPDO lists conditions under which the developer must apply to the local planning authority as to whether prior approval would be required. One of these is (a) transport impacts of the development, particularly to ensure safe site access. The Council has identified highways impacts in its reason for refusal.

[name] of the GPDO sets out the procedure for prior approval under Part 3. [name].(11)(c) states that development must not begin before the expiry of 56 days following the date on which the application, under sub-paragraph (2), was received by the local planning authority, without the authority notifying as to whether prior approval is given or refused. The appellant claims that the 56 days had expired before the refusal was issued, and therefore prior approval is deemed granted.

In light of the matters identified above, the main issues are: • whether planning permission is deemed to have been granted by reason of the timing of the Council’s decision; and • if planning permission has not deemed to have been granted, whether the proposal would be acceptable, having regard to the transport impacts of the development.

The Council received the prior approval application on 16th April 2025. The same day, it sent a letter to the appellant advising that the application was incomplete and a planning statement was required. This was subsequently provided on 30th April 2025, and the application was validated on the same day. The appellant then received an acknowledgement letter advising that they would receive written confirmation of the Council’s decision on the application by the 25th June 2025 (56 days after the application was validated). A decision was issued by the Council on 23rd June 2025.

The appellant contends that the original valid submission date was the 16th April, so the 56-day period would have expired on 10th June 2025 and given no decision was issued by this deadline, the prior approval was deemed granted.

However, [name](9) of the GPDO allows the Council to require the developer to submit such information as the authority may reasonably require in order to determine the application. Although the application did include a written description of the development and specified the net increase of dwellings in the application form, I consider that it was not unreasonable of the Council to require a planning statement in order to determine the application. Given this, it was reasonable of the Council to not valid the application until the document was received.

The appellant contends that no lawful suspension or extension was agreed or issued. However, I have not been directed to any relevant part of the GPDO which requires a suspension, or an extension, if further information is required.

Based on the evidence before me, I therefore consider that the 56 day period would have expired on 25th June, and the Council’s decision was issued within this time period. Given this, planning permission is not deemed to have been granted by reason of the timing of the Council’s decision.

The appeal site has a public transport accessibility level (PTAL) score of 1b, meaning it has poor accessibility to public transport. The appellant contends that [address] has public transport links. However, there are no further details regarding nearby public transport services before me. I therefore afford this point limited weight.

During my late morning site visit, there was evidence of parking stress in the area, with few parking spaces available. I recognise that my observations are only a snapshot of the conditions at the time of my visit, but given the built-up residential nature of the area, I have no reason to believe that what I saw is not representative. It is also likely that there would be an increased parking demand in the evenings and at weekends when more people are likely to be at home. Given the low PTAL score, I consider it likely that a future occupier of the one-bedroom flat would own a car.

The scheme would not provide any dedicated parking. The proposal would therefore likely lead to an increased demand for on-street car parking spaces, and a further reduction in the availability of on-street car parking spaces. There is no evidence before me to demonstrate that surrounding roads have sufficient capacity to accommodate any additional parking demand.

The appellant contends that the existing commercial use of the premises already has lawful parking provision. However, it is clear from the submitted plans that the proposal would not benefit from dedicated parking. The Council stipulates that the premises has been vacant for many years. It also appeared to be vacant at the time of my site visit. Therefore, based on the evidence before me I cannot be sure that the site was in an active Class E use, which would have attracted a parking demand, recently. I therefore afford this position limited weight in favour of the appeal.

I have limited information before me regarding the application at [address], which was granted prior approval (Ref: 24/0825/PNE). The Council outline how this application included a parking survey, however the appellant contends that the survey was not recent. Nonetheless, based on evidence before me, I cannot be sure that the circumstances under which this was approved, including any submitted surveys, are directly comparable to the scheme before me.

Whilst cycle parking may be provided in line with local standards, this does not outweigh the harm identified.

For the above reasons, I conclude that the proposed development would lead to unacceptable transport impacts. The proposal would therefore not accord with condition MA.2(2)(a) of Class MA of Schedule 2, Part 3 of the GPDO. Insofar as they are relevant to this main issue, the proposal would not comply with the transport and parking impact considerations of Policy TRC03 of the Barnet Local Plan 2021-2036 and Policy T6.1 of the London Plan.

The scheme may comply with other conditions and limitations of Class MA. Nonetheless, this is a neutral consideration and does not weigh in favour of, nor against the appeal.

The proposal would contribute to housing supply. However, my consideration of the case is solely limited to matters set out in the GPDO.

For the reasons set out above, the appeal is dismissed.