Appeal 6000642

The appeal is dismissed.

I note that there are discrepancies in the evidence relating to the floor area of the proposal, ranging from 130.06 sq.m in the Loveday marketing material, to 132 sq.m. and 134 sq.m. in the appellants statement of case and rebuttal statement of case. However, as these discrepancies are small, I have determined the appeal on the basis of the Loveday marketing figure.

The main issue is whether the appeal proposal represents an appropriate form of land use with regards to local and national policies.

The appeal site is located within the Erin Trade Park on the [address] [name]. The property is located on the east side of the main estate road, around 300m south of its main entrance from the A350 roundabout. It occupies a prominent location, such that it would be highly visible, both to people working in the estate, and to visitors to the numerous businesses located there.

[address] [name] is Chippenham’s principal industrial estate and is defined in the [name] 2015 (the [name]) by [name] CP1, CP2 and CP10 as a Principal Employment Area (PEA). Policy CP10 requires development in the Chippenham Community Area to be in accordance with the [name] set out in CP1. It identifies the principal employment areas which require development to be assessed under Policy CP35. The site is within both the framework boundary for Chippenham, and the PEA of [address] [name]. Policy CP35 is, therefore, relevant to the determination of the

Policy CP35 requires PEA’s to be retained for employment purposes within use classes B1 (replaced by use class E(g) in the amended Use Classes Order), B2 and B8. Proposals for redevelopment or change of use of buildings within PEA’s which are or were last used in one of the above use classes, must demonstrate that they meet six criteria. Of these only CP35(i) and CP35(v) are pertinent to this appeal, and which relate to employment numbers and marketing.

Policy CP35 criterion (i) requires that: ‘The proposed development will generate the same number, or more, permanent jobs than could be expected from the existing or any other potential employment use under the compliant use classes.’

The appellant has submitted evidence of the likely employment density for a variety of use class uses of the appeal premises. The number of employees range from 2 under a B8 use to 12 under a B1(a) (now E(g)(i)) Office use. The Council’s inward investment team have prepared alternative figures. However, whilst they use a different method of calculating the numbers, the overall figures broadly accord with those of the appellant, being based on the same source document.

The appellant had initially stated that the retail bakery falling within class E use would generate 10 full-time equivalent jobs. However, within their rebuttal statement of case, it is stated that the [name] team have now advised that a site-specific estimate is now 280 hours of cover a week, equating to 8 full-time equivalent jobs. This information is provided in a statement, with no supporting documentation, such as examples of other stores of similar size, with similar opening hours, together with records of staff employment numbers and type (full-time/part-time) associated with each unit, which would evidence the basis of the calculation, allowing examination of its validity.

The range of potential employment numbers which can be accommodated in the unit varies widely depending on the use type. The highest density of employment would come from Office or Call-Centre use, at 12 people. The appellant has averred that the appeal property is not suited to such uses due to its configuration. However, given the existing building’s design, its re-use for either offices or as a call centre could be possible and would accord with Policy CP35.

As the appeal proposal would at best provide 8 FTE jobs, this would not be greater than the 12 that could be achieved by a B1(a)/E(g)(i) office use. It has therefore not been proven that the proposal would generate the same number, or more, permanent jobs than could be expected from the existing, or any potential employment use. I therefore find that in this regard; the proposal would fail to meet criterion (i) of CP35. It would therefore be contrary to Policy CP35(i) of the [name], which requires, among other things, that development will generate the same number, or more, permanent jobs than the existing use.

Turning to criterion (v) of CP35, this requires that: ‘There is valid evidence that the site has no long term and strategic requirement to remain in employment use; the ability of the site to meet modern business needs must be considered, as well as its strategic value and contribution to the local and wider economy both currently and in the long term. It must be shown that the site is no longer viable for its present or any other employment use and that, in addition, it has remained unsold or un-let for a substantial period of time (at least 6 months), following genuine and sustained attempts to sell or let it on reasonable terms for employment use, taking into account prevailing market conditions.’

Criterion (v) of Policy CP35 has several strands, all of which should be addressed in any proposal for development which would change the use of employment land. The Council has confirmed that following the [name] 2023, that to address the imbalance of supply and demand, that change of use should be resisted on existing and allocated sites which continue to be suitable for employment. This would evidence that the appeal site has a long-term strategic requirement to remain in employment use. This is supported by Policy CP35.

The appellant states the appeal property has been vacant since its last tenant vacated it in December 2023 and has been actively marketed since that time, with few expressions of interest other than Greggs. They suggest that this is evidenced by the letter from Loveday, the letting agent, dated 6 February 2025. Examining the evidence submitted, whilst the Loveday letter provides a statement in relation to the marketing actions taken, there are issues with some of the evidence. Notably, on the screenshots of the websites referred to, marketing the appeal property, the date of the screenshot is either not visible or is incomplete in three of the four screenshots and only predates the Loveday letter by two days in the other.

It is also the case that in all of the images in the screenshots from the websites, not one evidences that a ‘[name] sign was displayed on the appeal property at that time, though one was in place at the time of my visit and is shown in a separate image on the Loveday letter. For the above reasons, I find that insufficient conclusive evidence has been provided to demonstrate that the appeal property has been actively marketed for a period longer than 6 months.

Further, whilst the appellant states that there has been little serious interest in the appeal property, they have not demonstrated that the appeal property is no longer viable for its present or any other employment use, as is required by criterion (v) of Policy CP35. Indeed, the appellant does not dispute that the site is suitable for employment use, as they note in paragraph 6.16 of their statement.

At my visit it was evident that the appeal property, whilst not being a recent development, was in good condition, as further evidenced by the submitted Loveday sales and letting literature. It is therefore clear that it would be able to meet modern business needs, as required by criterion (v) of CP35. Its size is such that it would also provide suitable accommodation for small businesses wanting to expand, or for new businesses requiring small premises. It would therefore demonstrate a strategic value to the local and wider economy.

For the above reasons, I find that the proposal has not demonstrated that it has met the requirements of exclusion criteria (v) of Policy CP35. Consequently, I therefore find that it would be contrary to Policy CP35(v) of the [name], which requires, among other things, development to demonstrate that the site is no longer viable for its present or any other employment use.

For the reasons set out above, I conclude that the appeal proposal would conflict with the development plan, read as a whole, and that there are no material considerations, including policies in the Framework, that would justify determining other than in accordance with it. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.