Appeal 6000819

Appeal A is dismissed.

Appeal B is dismissed.

As set out in the banner heading above, there are two appeals before me. Whilst they relate to different buildings, there are common matters between them. For this reason, I have considered the two appeals concurrently but on their own merits.

During the appeal process, the appellants submitted revised plans. These sought to address reason for refusal (‘RFR’) 4 in [name] and B, relating to parking provision and cycle storage, and RFR 5 in Appeal B relating to minimum bedroom size. The proposed changes were minor and accepting the amending plans would not prejudice any party. In advance of the hearing, the Council confirmed that they no longer sought to defend RFR 4 in [name] and B and RFR 5 in Appeal B. I have therefore dealt with the appeals on this basis.

Both appeals relate to proposals advanced under Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part 3, Class MA of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended) (“the GPDO”). Class MA permits the change of use of a building from Class E (commercial, business and service) of Schedule 2 to the Town and Country Planning ([name]) Order 1987 (UCO) to Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of Schedule 1 to the UCO.

In both appeals, the Council’s substantive reasons for refusal concern whether the proposals fall to be considered under Class MA, having regard to the lawful use of the buildings. If Class MA is applicable, the Council further disputes whether the proposals would constitute permitted development when assessed against Class MA.1 of the GPDO, with particular reference to whether the appeal buildings are within the curtilage of a listed building. Where applicable, the Council also raises concerns as to whether prior approval should be granted, specifically in relation to the requirement to provide adequate natural light to all habitable rooms of the proposed dwellinghouses under paragraph MA.2 (2) (f) of the GPDO.

Accordingly, the starting point and main issue in both appeals is whether the proposals constitute permitted development under Class MA of the GPDO, with particular regard to whether the use carried out in the buildings falls within Class E.

The appeals relate to two separate buildings, known as the [site address] (Appeal A) and the Stockwell Building (Appeal B) located within [name] (BCC). Although currently unoccupied, there is no dispute that at the relevant date 1 the buildings were owned and occupied by the Council and that both the [site address] and the Stockwell Building comprised largely of offices. The Council’s case is that the office use was part and parcel of the overall use of the site for the administration of local government functions which falls within a sui generis use. The appellants’ case is that both buildings are a separate and distinct planning unit such that their use as offices falls within Class E of the UCO.

The BCC is made up of a number of buildings within the grounds of the [name], a [name] listed building. The buildings, occupied by the Council from the 1980’s until it vacated the site in 2024, are largely concentrated on land to the north of the [name]. What remains of the expansive parkland setting of the [name], lies to the south and is known as Bromley Palace Park (‘the Park’).

The various buildings across the BCC site contained committee rooms, the Council Chamber, a canteen open to staff and the public, areas for civic hospitality and functions and public reception areas. They also contained offices for Council staff, which were not publicly accessible. 1 At least 2 years prior to the date of the application for prior approval, as set out in Class MA.1. of the GDPO

The [site address] (Appeal A) had a public reception and a secured area with meeting booths, but offices on all floors beyond the secured area were not publicly accessible.

The Stockwell Building (Appeal B) had two public reception areas including one for the registrar, and an area for wedding ceremonies. The rest of the building was not publicly accessible. The basement contained secure mayoral garages, staff parking and a link to the public multi-storey car park.

There is significant variation in the architectural styles, materials and mass of each of the buildings on the BCC site such that each building is physically distinct in its appearance and there is no overall visual coherence. They also appear to be structurally free standing and contain their own toilet and kitchen facilities. The predominant use of most of the buildings on the site was as offices, not accessible to the public.

Nonetheless, all of the buildings on the BCC site are physically linked either by external covered walkways or link buildings. The public were permitted to enter and freely move around all external areas of the site on foot. I observed that there were a number of signs directing the public to the Council Chamber, committee rooms, main reception and the Park. Visitors were not required to report to the main reception to enter the BCC site or to access all services. Where Council departments had their own reception, members of the public could go directly there. There was pedestrian access from various locations including directly from the Park, [site address] and [address].

I observed that the vehicular entrance from [address] had automatic barriers. I was told at the hearing that this allowed the parking area next to the [site address] to be restricted to use by staff and visitors during the week and opened for paid public parking at the weekend. An automatic barrier also provided vehicular access for wedding cars and the mayor’s car into the courtyard to the north of the [name], via the under croft of the [site address] .

It is clear that the BCC operated as a campus for the exercise of local government functions. The site had distinctive civic features such as the Council Chamber, committee rooms and the registrar which took place in different parts of the site. The civic and administrative uses were distributed across multiple buildings with the purpose of administering the local government functions of the Council. This enabled staff and functions to move around the buildings interchangeably.

Whilst the [site address] and Stockwell Building comprised almost exclusively of offices, they were occupied in order to administer those local government functions. The buildings in the BCC were under one ownership, physically linked to the other buildings and operated as one entity. This meant that there was unrestricted public access to the grounds, various parts of the buildings and the public involvement in civic functions taking place at the BCC which went beyond that of a conventional office use.

I have had regard to Burdle2 and the relevant case law3 set out by the appellants. Burdle establishes that the planning unit is usually the unit of occupation unless a 2 Burdle & Williams v SSE & New Forest RDC [1972] 1 WLR 1207 3 [name] for England v Secretary of State for the Environment (1996) 71 P & CR 73; Johnston v Secretary of State for the Environment (1974) 28 P & CR 424; East Barnet Urban District Council v British Transport Commission smaller area can be identified which, as a matter of fact and degree, is physically separate and distinct, and occupied for different and unrelated purposes. I have found that the appeal buildings were not.

Accordingly, I find that, as a matter of fact and degree, the BCC is a single planning unit. It comprises of a complex of buildings, including the [site address] and the Stockwell Building with the sole purpose of carrying out local government functions. This amounts to a sui generis use. Accordingly, the appeal buildings do not fall within Class E of the UCO.

My attention has been drawn to the Weymouth appeal4 but the circumstances are not the same as those before me. For example, the building in that appeal did not include a Council Chamber, there were only two small committee rooms and no registrar office. Public access was restricted to one single small reception area and there was no indication that the public were able to freely move around the site, in the way they were able to around the BCC.

The circumstances before me in this case are more aligned with those in the City Hall case5 where there was found to be a debating chamber and all the paraphernalia of party politics, a significant degree of public involvement in and public access to the buildings, the characteristics of public debate and decision making, administering services, responding to queries from the public, together with a range of other public and ceremonial activities. However, whilst I have had regard to the City Hall case, the circumstances are not identical to those before me. I have therefore determined these appeals on the facts before me.

Whilst the Council appear to no longer offer a walk-in customer service or duty planning officer at their new premises on [address], there is no evidence that this was the case at the BCC.

The Council has previously determined that the [name], [address] and part of the [name], were sufficiently distinct in terms of their uses and physical connection to the overall civic use of the site, that they formed planning units in their own right. In particular, the [name] were detached and are located in the southwestern corner of the Park. They had been used as offices by the Council but were sold in 2012. They also had their own separate vehicular access from [address]. [address] was a detached building occupied as a residential dwelling and part of the [name] had been used for purposes unconnected with the civic uses on site as a children’s soft play centre, a gym and a food bank. The circumstances surrounding those buildings are sufficiently different to those before me, that they do not alter my conclusion.

The planning permission6 relating to the Council’s new premises is for external alterations rather than the use of the building. The reference in the description to ‘at existing office building’ is not definitive in terms of the authorised use of the building. Similarly, the planning permission for the Stockwell Building7 which refers and Another; Manchester City Council v Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government and R. (on the application of Searle) v Secretary of State for the Environment 4 Appeal Ref: APP/P1235/W/16/3165092 Former Council Offices, [name], Weymouth [postcode] 5 [name] v Secretary of State for the Environment, [name] and the Inner London Education Authority [1990] 1 WLR 744 6 [name]: 24/02410/FULL1 Alterations to rooftop plant and ductwork at existing office building, including installation of replacement air handling units (AHU) and ductwork on roof, with elevational alterations to western elevation (rear access road) comprising installation of 2 no. louvres within curtain walling at [address], [address], Bromley 7 [name]: 88.2800 for Erection of 3 / 4 Storey office block with semi-basement car parking and single storey link buildings to ‘office block’ does not preclude its use as offices as part of the wider civic centre use of the site.

The BCC Marketing Brochure8 refers to both appeal buildings as being offices. Given my findings at paragraph 26, this is not surprising, but neither is it conclusive in respect of the authorised use of the building for the reasons set out elsewhere in this decision.

I have been referred to a number of other decisions which the appellants say relate to converting council offices to residential use9 including the planning permission granted in respect of the Rothwell council offices in Leeds10 and [address] Town Hall in Tower Hamlets11. However, from the limited information provided I have been unable to draw any direct comparison with the situation as I see it at BCC and the appeals before me. I have also been referred to planning permission granted by the London Borough of [name] for the [name] Hospital12 and the redevelopment of [name] Centre13 but the particular circumstances which led to the Councils ascribing a different use to parts of those buildings are not before me.

I therefore conclude that on the circumstances before me in this case, the proposals in respect of [name] and B would not constitute permitted development as defined by Class MA of the GPDO. Accordingly, there is no need for me to go on and consider whether the proposal would be within the curtilage of a listed building or the impacts of the development in respect of adequate natural light.

For the reasons given above, I conclude that both Appeal A and Appeal B should be dismissed.