Appeal 6001265

The appeal is dismissed.

An application for costs was made by [name] against West Suffolk Council. This application is the subject of a separate decision.

The proposal is for permission in principle. The Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) advises that this is an alternative way of obtaining planning permission for housing-led development. The permission in principle consent route has two stages: the first stage (or permission in principle stage) establishes whether a site is suitable in-principle, and the second ‘technical details consent’ (TDC) stage is when the detailed development proposals are assessed. This appeal relates to the first of these two stages.

The scope of the considerations for permission in principle is limited to location, land use and the amount of development permitted. All other matters are considered as part of a subsequent technical details consent application if permission in principle is granted. I have determined the appeal accordingly and have considered the proposed block plan as indicative only.

Permission in principle can be sought for a range of dwellings by expressing a minimum and maximum net number of dwellings as part of the application. In this instance, permission in principle has been sought for one dwelling on the appeal site.

The appeal is accompanied by a unilateral undertaking (UU), which is intended to ensure that the proposed dwelling would be constructed and occupied as a self-built or custom-built development. The Council contends there are deficiencies with the UU. However, irrespective of this, the PPG sets out that planning conditions and obligations can only be imposed or secured at the technical details consent stage1. Accordingly, 1 Paragraph: 022 [name]: 58-[phone] even if I were to find it legally sound and policy compliant, the UU is not capable of taking legal effect in relation to the present appeal. Nevertheless, as an obligation of this nature could be effective at the technical details stage, I have had regard to the intentions of this UU in my consideration of this appeal and will return to this matter below.

The main issue is whether the site is suitable for residential development, having regard to its location, land use and the amount of development proposed, with particular regard to relevant development plan policies for development in the countryside and the site’s accessibility to services and facilities.

The appeal site relates to land to the north of the former [name] public house which has been converted to residential use. It contains existing concrete garages which I observed to be in an overgrown state and lies on the eastern side of the A1088/ [site address] . Given the proximity to other dwellings and built form, the appeal site is not isolated for the purposes of paragraph 84 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework). Nevertheless, there is no dispute between the parties that the site lies outside of a defined settlement boundary, within the countryside.

Policy SP21 of the West Suffolk Local Plan 2024-2041 (the LP) sets out, amongst other things, that new dwellings will be permitted in the countryside so long as they (a) are within a small cohesive group of seven or more existing dwellings next to or fronting an existing highway; (b) consist of the infilling of a small undeveloped plot commensurate with the scale and character of existing dwellings within an otherwise continuous built-up frontage and (c) are in a location with access to sustainable transport links, including footpaths, cycle routes and/or adequate public transport to a settlement in the hierarchy defined in policy SP13. Locations that are so remote or so poorly served by sustainable transport options that occupants will rely exclusively on a car to access everyday goods and services will not be supported.

Even though the site is not considered to be isolated, Policy SP21 and the Council’s spatial strategy is consistent with the Framework insofar as it seeks to direct housing in accordance with a settlement hierarchy to locations which have sustainable access to services and facilities and promotes sustainable development in rural areas.

The appeal site is adjacent to a cluster of five dwellings which front an existing highway. To the north, fields and woodland separate the site from other buildings situated much further along [site address] . Other properties exist to the south-west; however, these do not front the highway and are some distance from the appeal site. The appeal site would be spatially contiguous with existing properties to the south, and I note the development would replace existing garage structures on the land, which is relatively well enclosed. However, despite its proximity and relationship with the former [name] site, the appeal site is not within a small cohesive group of seven or more existing dwellings next to or fronting the highway. In addition, it would not infill a small undeveloped plot within an otherwise continuous built-up frontage. While the appellant contends the development would round-off an existing, visually contained, built envelope, upon plain reading of the policy, which I note has been recently adopted and tested against the Framework, the development would be contrary to criterions (a) and (b) of Policy SP21.

[site address] comprises a relatively small collection of scattered development which straddles either side of the A1088. Ixworth, which is defined as a key service centre under Policy SP13 of the LP, is understood to contain various services including schools, healthcare, convenience shopping, post office, public houses, and community facilities. The appellant estimates the site is approximately 1.7 miles from Ixworth, access to which would be via the A1088 which is generally unlit, without a footpath for much of its length and subject to a 40-60mph speed limit. Even though the road to Ixworth contains verges and relatively good visibility, given the distance involved and the nature of the route, it would unlikely be an attractive and practical walking or cycling route for all users, or in all circumstances.

A bus stop is located opposite the appeal site; however, I understand this is only served by a once-a-week service. The appellant advises that the nearest bus stop is in Ixworth centre, providing regular weekday and Saturday services to higher-order centres such as Thetford and [site address] . However, access to these services would still necessitate travelling to Ixworth itself. Consequently, in all reasonable likelihood, future occupants of the development would be heavily reliant on private vehicles to meet their daily needs.

I acknowledge that opportunities to maximise sustainable transport solutions vary from urban to rural areas and that, having regard to decisions of the Courts2, sustainability must be considered in the round. In this case, car journeys to Ixworth would be relatively short and future occupiers would help to support the vitality of services and facilities in the surrounding area. Moreover, the number of vehicle movements arising from a single dwelling would not be significant and the use of electric vehicles could reduce their environmental effects.

However, the site’s poor connectivity by sustainable travel modes nonetheless points, generally, to it being in a location where sustainable modes could not be maximised. Considering my conclusions above, provision of cycle parking on site would not overcome these concerns. Accordingly, the appeal scheme would be contrary to criterion (c) of Policy SP21. The fact that the site is not isolated in the context of the Framework does not remove the need to comply with the requirements of this policy and the development plan when taken as a whole, particularly since not all development within the countryside will necessarily be isolated.

I understand that permission was granted for the construction of garages3 on the appeal site to serve the dwellings within the former [name], which the appellant considers represents a fall-back position on the land. However, the construction of garages for use incidental to existing dwellings, which I understand were formed from the conversion of the former public house, is subject to different planning considerations than this appeal and does not establish the acceptability of the principle of an independent new dwelling on the site.

The appellant in support of the appeal has referred to several examples 4 that they consider to be comparable to the appeal scheme due to their locations and reliance on private transport. However, I have very little information on the site-specific circumstances of these cases and cannot be sure how comparable they are to this appeal. Nevertheless, it is clear that the accessibility of services and facilities by 2 [name] v SSCLG, Greyread Ltd & Granville Developments Ltd [2018] [name] 610 3 Council Ref. SE/12/1667/FUL 4 APP/J1860/W/24/3354156, APP/L2630/W/24/3346313, APP/W0530/W/24/3352408, APP/D3505/W/24/3348369, APP/X3540/W/24/3347785, APP/L3815/W/25/3361375, APP/D3505/W/21/3288045, APP/X3540/W/23/3330857. means other than the private car were assessed as being acceptable in some of these examples and the sites were found to be close to service centres or service villages, which is different to the circumstances of the case before me. Moreover, several were allowed on the basis that material considerations outweighed the harms identified in the overall planning balance, some of which were following engagement of paragraph 11(d) of the Framework, indicating that a decision should be made other than in accordance with the development plan. This is a matter of planning judgement and an exercise which I will undertake in a subsequent section of this appeal, considering this appeal scheme on its individual merits. Nevertheless, overall, the approaches taken in these cases are not directly comparable to this appeal before me and do not alter my conclusions above.

For the above reasons, I therefore conclude that the site would not be a suitable for residential development due to its location, land use and the amount of development proposed, having particular regard to relevant development plan policies for development in the countryside and the site’s accessibility to services and facilities. This is contrary to Policies SP12, SP13 and SP21 of the LP and Policy IXW1 of the Ixworth Neighbourhood Plan (2025) which together and amongst other things, seek to direct development to the most sustainable locations within the district and provide criteria that new dwellings in the countryside must comply with.

Paragraph 70b) of the Framework supports small sites to come forward for self-build and custom-build (SBCB) housing. The Council also has a duty under the [name] and Custom Housebuilding Act 2015 (as amended by the Housing and Planning Act

to keep a register of persons who are interested in acquiring a SBCB plot, and to also grant enough suitable development permissions for serviced plots to meet the identified demand for the area. Policies SP20 and SP21 of the LP support the delivery of SBCB housing, subject to proposals also complying with all other relevant policies in the LP and sets a target of 30 plots per annum. The Council concedes that it has not delivered sufficient permissions to meet this duty in recent monitoring periods.

Notwithstanding my previous comments on the UU, the appellant advances the proposal as a SBCB dwelling. Subject to this being secured at the TDC stage, this would help to meet the demand for such housing in the area. Unlike some of the examples cited to me by the appellant, I do not have substantive, detailed evidence before me regarding the current extent of the Council’s shortfall of SBCB plots. However, the appellant’s evidence indicates that the Council has previously cited a shortfall of 74 plots as of 30 October 2023.

On this basis, the appellant submits that Paragraph 11d) of the Framework is engaged because the most important policies for determining the application are out of date. However, the Council can demonstrate a five-year housing land supply and for reasons I have already explained, the policies which are most important for determining the proposal, as a collective basket, are not out of date. Indeed, they are consistent with the Framework, noting that the LP has only recently been adopted. This includes Policy SP20 which sets out a strategy which seeks to address the SBCB housing requirement through windfall developments or allocations within settlement boundaries. Therefore, the tilted balance in Paragraph 11d) of the Framework does not apply in this instance.

Nevertheless, the Council’s shortfall in meeting the demand for SBCB plots is a material planning consideration of significant weight. However, the construction of one dwelling would make only a small contribution to the shortfall identified which attracts no more than moderate weight in favour of the appeal in this particular case.

The appellant refers to the site as brownfield land, and I note the Framework affords substantial weight to the value of using suitable brownfield land within settlements for homes. However, despite the development making effective use of under-utilised land to provide one dwelling which would contribute towards housing supply in the district, in this case the appeal site is located outside of a settlement, in the countryside.

The evidence also refers to an intention to construct the dwelling to high standards of inclusive, accessible design and to utilise energy efficient low-carbon technologies. However, there are no mechanisms available at this stage to secure such standards or other potential benefits cited by the appellant such as improving the appearance of the site, additional landscaping and biodiversity features. While these may be relevant considerations at the TDC stage, they carry only limited weight in the determination of this appeal. The assertion that the development would be designed to comply with relevant development plan policies and technical standards is also a neutral matter.

The site lies within the 26.5km zone of influence of the Breckland Special Protection Area (SPA) and Special Area of Conservation (SAC) which are European Sites5. The Council confirms that a financial contribution has been received in accordance with the Council’s Recreational Disturbance Avoidance and [name] which would mitigate any likely significant effects of the development on the integrity of the SPA and SAC. [name] found the appeal scheme to be acceptable in all other regards it would have been necessary for me to examine this matter in further detail. However, as I have found that the scheme would be unacceptable for another reason, it is not necessary for me to consider whether this payment would appropriately mitigate any [name] on the integrity of the European Site or to undertake an Appropriate Assessment.

The proposed development would provide one SBCB build dwelling which would make an effective use of previously developed underutilised land that would contribute towards local housing supply and the Council’s SBCB housing shortfall. As a small-site, it could also be built-out reasonably quickly. The development would therefore make a small but beneficial contribution to the choice of homes in the area and the supply of housing land; as well as providing social and economic benefits during construction and after occupation.

Housing delivery is supported by the Framework and, therefore, this benefit weighs in favour of the proposal. However, given the scale of the development, any social, economic or environmental benefits associated with the delivery of one dwelling would be relatively limited, even taking account of the objective of significantly boosting the supply of housing in the Framework and the Council’s duty to provide sufficient SBCB housing plots, and would not outweigh the harm I have identified. 5 As defined by regulation 8 of the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 (as amended) (the Habitats Regulations)

Consequently, for the reasons given above, I conclude that the proposal conflicts with the development plan as a whole and material considerations do not indicate that a decision should be made other than in accordance with it. Accordingly, the appeal should be dismissed.