Appeal 6001379

The appeal is dismissed.

The site visit was undertaken by a representative of the Inspector whose recommendation is set out below and to which the Inspector has had regard before deciding the appeal.

An application for an award of costs was made by [name] against the Council of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham. This application is the subject of a separate decision.

The main issues are the effects of the proposed development on a) the character and appearance of the area; and b) highway safety with specific regard to on and off-street parking.

The appeal site comprises an end-terraced dwelling occupying a prominent position close to the junction of [address] and [address]. The property lies within the [name], which the Council identifies as a Non-Designated Heritage Asset (NDHA). The significance of which stems from its development as part of the “Homes for Heroes” initiative between 1921 and 1934, at the time forming the largest municipal estate in the world. Properties within the estate are notable for their simplicity, functional design, and consistency of appearance, generally following linear building lines.

Planning Practice Guidance makes clear that, irrespective of the method by which NDHAs are identified, such must be supported by sound evidence. In this case, the material before me relates to the estate’s historic development, architectural qualities and planned spatial arrangement provides a sufficiently robust evidential basis for identifying it as a NDHA.

Furthermore, several of the cited appeal decisions demonstrate that Inspectors have previously accepted the same on the evidence presented to them, reinforcing the view that its heritage value is both recognised and consistently upheld in planning judgments. While a small number of decisions have reached a different conclusion, these nonetheless acknowledge the clearly planned nature of the estate. Taking all of this into account, I am satisfied that it constitutes a NDHA for the purposes of this appeal.

[address] is defined by two consistent rows of terraced houses arranged in uniform blocks of six and seven on each opposing side of the street, a deliberate and legible pairing that contributes to the compositional balance of this part of the estate. Their largely unaltered facades sit behind modest front gardens, many of which have been adapted for off‐street parking, maintaining a clear and uniform building line. The regular plot widths and spacing give the street a strong repeating rhythm. The appeal site sits at right angles to Number [address] (No. 41) and adjacent a corner green resulting in a large splayed gap between the two properties. This gap and corner green is replicated in the opposite terraced row which, together with the consistent scale and massing of the dwellings and limited extensions, make a positive contribution to and strongly reflect the estate’s original character and layout.

Although the scheme has been amended following the dismissal of 3348515, the massing and position of the new dwelling, set hard against the boundary with No. 41, would unacceptably erode the visual separation created by the existing splayed gap and adjoining green. This separation is integral to the spacious corner arrangement that forms part of the estate’s planned layout. [name]. 41 incorporates a single‐storey garage along the shared boundary, and that a modest side porch exists on the end terrace opposite, these structures are limited in height and projection and therefore do not materially diminish the openness of the corner or interrupt the visual break created by the splayed form.

The appeal scheme would remain highly visible from both [address] and [address]. When viewed from these vantage points, the development would present as a tightly constrained and overly intensive form of infill, appearing contrived and failing to respect the spacious qualities of the corner setting. The proposed projection beyond the established building line, currently followed by both the host property and the dwellings opposite, would further contribute to a visually intrusive form that would sit out of keeping with its surroundings. Therefore, the proposal would undermine the planned nature of the estate’s built form, disrupting the consistent layout, spacing, and architectural rhythm that characterise it.

Adding a further unit would create a run of seven dwellings to mirror the adjacent terrace. However, the existing arrangement, two opposing terraces of six, forms part of the planned composition. Introducing an additional end unit here would upset that balance rather than enhance symmetry, particularly given the loss of the splayed separation to the corner green. This would conflict with the guidance set out by the Barking and [name] and Alterations Supplementary Planning Document (2012), which seeks to protect prominent gaps between buildings and requires that side additions respect the form, detailing, and proportional balance of existing development.

The National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) advises that, when considering proposals affecting NDHAs, a balanced judgement is required having regard to the scale of any harm and the significance of the asset. In this case, the harm I have identified would affect key elements of the estate’s significance, including its planned openness of the corner greens, uniformity of layout and the clarity of its spatial hierarchy. These attributes form an integral part of the estate’s historic and architectural interest. I recognise that the extent of harm in this instance would be localised within the context of the estate as a whole, nevertheless, incremental losses of this nature can cumulatively erode significance over time. I therefore attach considerable weight to this harm.

The proposal would deliver an additional residential unit and generate short‐term economic activity through construction. However, these benefits are modest in scale and attract only limited weight. They do not amount to benefits of sufficient substance to outweigh the considerable weight I must give to the harm identified to the significance of the estate as a NDHA.

The proposals would therefore harm the character and appearance of the area and, by association, the integrity of the estate as a NDHA. As such it would conflict with Policy HC1 of The London Plan 2021 and Policies SPP6, SP2, DMD1, and DMD4 of the London Borough of Barking and Dagenham’s Local Plan 2024 (LP). These, amongst other things, seek to ensure new development is of high-quality design that preserves local character and heritage significance.

The appeal site has a Public Transport Accessibility Level (PTAL) of 2, which denotes a low level of accessibility to such. In these locations, it is reasonable to conclude that the occupiers of the unit would be predominantly reliant on the private car to meet day‐to‐day needs. In addition, [address] and the surrounding streets fall within a [name] (CPZ), where parking is restricted to permit holders. The presence of the CPZ is indicative of existing high demand for on‐street parking. When combined with the site’s low PTAL rating, this reinforces the need for the development to provide functional and convenient off‐street parking to avoid further pressure on the local highway network.

The submitted plans show two off‐street parking spaces, one to serve the host dwelling and the other to serve the proposed unit, both accessed via the existing single dropped kerb. The arrangement would be severely constrained. The available width is such that, if a vehicle were parked within the host dwelling’s space, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a second vehicle to enter or exit into the proposed unit’s space. This lack of independent access would undermine the practicality of one space and would likely deter future occupants from using it. This would displace further parking demand onto the street, where I noted during my site visit that there is already considerable pressure therefore.

In addition, the mature hedge and solid boundary fencing along the southwestern edge of the site would substantially restrict visibility for drivers emerging from the proposed parking spaces. The presence of a designated on‐street parking bay immediately adjacent the access exacerbates this constraint should it be occupied. As a consequence, the ability of drivers to see approaching pedestrians, cyclists or vehicles would be unacceptably compromised. Conversely, if vehicles were to reverse into or out of the site to circumvent these limitations, they would momentarily obstruct the carriageway and impede the free flow of traffic. Given the constrained nature of the local highway network and the pressures created by the CPZ, these factors would combine to pose an unacceptable risk to highway safety.

To be effective as a car‐free development, a suitable mechanism would be required to ensure future residents of the proposed unit would not be eligible for a residents parking permit. No such thing has been secured. In its absence, it is reasonably likely that future occupants would seek to obtain a permit and park within the CPZ, thereby adding further pressure to streets already experiencing high demand. While the appellant suggests that the occupiers of the host dwelling may be able to obtain a permit, this too would simply result in additional parking within the CPZ and would not address the underlying lack of usable off‐street provision for the new dwelling. Moreover, it would create an awkward and uncharacteristic situation whereby vehicles belonging to neighbouring occupiers may park immediately in front of the host dwelling’s principal ground‐floor window, undermining the quality of the residential environment for occupiers. There is no substantive evidence, such as an on‐street parking survey, to demonstrate that sufficient capacity exists to accommodate the likely parking demand.

Consequently, the proposal would result in harm to the safe and efficient use of the highway. It would therefore conflict with Policy T1 of the London Plan and Policy DMT2 of the LP which, amongst other things, require development to have regard to highway safety. The Framework advises that planning permission should be refused where a proposal would have an unacceptable impact on highway safety. Paragraph 11 of the Framework

The Council cannot currently demonstrate the supply of housing sites as required by the Framework. In such circumstances, paragraph 11(d)(ii) indicates that, where there are no relevant development plan policies, or the policies which are most important for determining the application are out of date, planning permission should be granted unless any adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits when assessed against the Framework as a whole, having particular regard to key policies for directing development to sustainable locations, making effective use of land, securing well-designed places and providing affordable homes, individually or in combination.

In this case, the proposal would result in harm to the character and appearance of the area and highway safety. These would be significant and enduring, and in the case of highway safety matters be potentially impactive to life. They would conflict with the relevant parts of the Framework, sections 9, 12 and 16 particularly. I therefore afford them substantial weight. The benefits of the scheme, including the addition of one unit and associated economic activity during construction and occupation, would be limited in scale and largely temporary. While the shortfall in housing supply is acknowledged and attracts moderate weight, the contribution of one dwelling would make only a minimal difference to addressing that deficit.

Although the appeal site occupies a sustainable location, the proposal would not deliver affordable housing and would result in the identified harms concerning the use of land and design/siting. When assessed against the Framework as a whole, these adverse impacts would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the limited benefits of the development. Therefore, the presumption in favour of sustainable development does not apply.

I have been referred to the Mayor of [name] London Plan Guidance (2023), the Housing in London 2024 evidence base, and the October 2025 “Homes for London, A Package of Support for Housebuilding in London” policy statement. These documents collectively highlight the strategic importance of small site delivery and the wider ambition to support incremental intensification across London. However, they do not form part of the development plan, and the typologies and examples they contain are illustrative rather than prescriptive. As such, they cannot outweigh clear conflict with adopted Local Plan policies or negate the requirement for a rigorous, context‐led assessment of each site. Accordingly, while I acknowledge the strategic policy ambition to increase the contribution of small sites to London’s housing stock, this does not outweigh the specific, locally evidenced harm that would arise from the appeal scheme.

Whilst the appeal site is within walking distance of [name], where the Council has identified opportunities for transformational growth and new housing provision. The site itself does not fall within the designated growth area or its associated policy boundary. As such, the area‐specific policies and spatial strategies for [name] do not apply.

Appeal 3308125 concerned the erection of a bungalow in a rear garden. It was determined prior to the adoption of the current LP. The Inspector in that case found that the proposal would retain a gap to the neighbouring dwelling such that the overall sense of openness was not materially diminished. It was also located on a pedestrianised ‘banjo’ cul-de-sac, so its context was materially different to the appeal site.

Similarly, the new dwelling permitted at [address] was also assessed under the former LP and was situated on a larger plot than the current appeal site. The scheme allowed for two independent off‐street parking spaces served by a separate access from the host dwelling. Although that scheme reduced the side gap at the rear, the Inspector found that substantial open space would remain to the front of the plot. Appeal 3326911 involved the conversion of an existing dwelling into two units. No external building works were proposed, and the site was not located on a corner plot. The properties were accessed from a relatively quiet lane, and dedicated parking for both units was provided.

With regard to the subdivision of [address], determined prior to the adoption of the current LP, the site formed part of a continuous terrace rather than a corner plot. I have not been provided with the full reasoning to allow a meaningful comparison with the appeal scheme. The subsequent permission for a porch at [address] was assessed on its own merits and was considered to be generally in keeping with the established pattern of development. This was for a materially different form of development to that which forms the appeal before me.

The permissions at [address] relate to two‐storey side extensions on a substantially wider plot. In each scheme, a significant gap would remain to the side boundary, with the extension set in from the site edge. The approved scheme at No. [address] follows a similar arrangement. These proposals differ substantially from the appeal scheme, which would occupy most of the side gap and abut the boundary with No. 41.

The further examples, 24/00581/HSE, 24/00771/HSE, 24/00770/HSE, and 23/01138/HSE, are all permissions for side extensions rather than new dwellings, many of which incorporated a meaningful set‐in from the boundary or a significant setback from the frontage. The side extensions at [address] and [address] both retained notable openness due to the width of their plots and were found to integrate with the host buildings without harming the street scene.

The new dwelling at [address] was a resubmission of a previously refused scheme. This site is not a corner plot and retains a gap to the side, with sufficient space to accommodate parking without reliance on a shared or constrained access.

The porch permissions at [address], [address], and [address] relate to modest front additions, none of which are located on corner plots or materially alter established spatial gaps. In some cases, the proposals could have been built under permitted development rights, and they were found to be in keeping with the existing pattern of development.

The examples cited at [address], [address] and [address], are also not directly comparable to the circumstances of the appeal proposal. Only the developments at [address] and [address] proceeded without off‐street parking. In both of those cases, the decision‐maker had clear evidence regarding local parking conditions and accessibility levels which justified that approach. [address], the site benefitted from a moderate PTAL rating, resulting in lower anticipated car‐parking demand. In the case of [address], although the PTAL rating was low, evidence demonstrated that on‐street parking capacity was generally available and that parking bays were rarely fully occupied. This provided a site‐specific rationale for omitting off‐street provision. The scheme at [address] included a shared highway crossover, but insufficient detail has been provided to show whether its access arrangements, local parking conditions, or accessibility context are comparable to those at the appeal site.

Each cited decision turns on materially different circumstances, whether because they relate to side extensions rather than new dwellings, involve the subdivision of existing buildings, are situated on significantly wider plots, are not adjacent to corner greens and therefore have the same sensitivities regarding openness and the planned spatial arrangement of the estate or have different parking arrangements. While consistency in decision making is important, it does not follow that the same outcome will always occur. The factual and contextual differences in the examples cited are such that they do not alter my findings.

I am aware of the appellant’s concerns regarding the Council’s handling of the application, including a perceived lack of consistency in decision‐making. While such concerns are noted, they do not bear upon the planning merits of the scheme before me and have not influenced the outcome of this appeal. I have addressed matters relating to the appellant’s costs application as part of a separate decision.

There are no material considerations, including the approach of the Framework, that would attract sufficient weight to indicate a decision other than in accordance with the development plan with which the appeal scheme would conflict owing to my findings on the main issues. It is for these reasons that I recommend the appeal is dismissed.

I have considered all the submitted evidence and my representative’s report and on that basis the appeal is dismissed.