Appeal 6001774

The appeal is dismissed.

The description given in the application form contained a significant amount of superfluous information. In the interests of clarity and conciseness, I have utilised the description given in the decision notice.

The appeal is accompanied by a draft [name] (UU) made pursuant to Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. The UU seeks to secure financial contributions towards a [name]. Although the contents of the UU do not form part of the reasons for refusal, I have nevertheless assessed the planning obligation against Regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 and Paragraph 58 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework), in the event that planning permission were to be granted.

The main issues are: • whether the proposed development would provide an appropriate arrangement of vehicle parking; and, • whether the submitted UU would ensure that an appropriate contribution is made towards [name].

The proposed development would seek to provide four flats within an existing dwelling. In such circumstances, an appropriate parking arrangement for the vehicles of the future occupiers of these flats must be incorporated into the design of the proposed scheme. The Parking Standards Supplementary Planning Document 2017 (SPD) provides guidance on the level of parking provision expected to accommodate future demand arising from new development. Although the SPD is not a statutory requirement, it remains an important material consideration in the assessment and determination of planning applications.

Section 3 of the SPD sets out the minimum residential parking standards, including specific requirements for apartment conversions. For one‐bedroom units, such as those proposed in this application, the guidance indicates that one parking space should be provided per apartment. The scheme proposes four parking spaces, thereby meeting the recommended standard.

Section 6, together with Table 7 of the SPD, outlines the expected provision for cycle parking. For one‐bedroom apartments, the guidance again requires one cycle space per dwelling. The submitted plans show provision for six cycle spaces, which would exceed the minimum requirement and therefore represent an over‐provision in this regard.

Particular regard has been given to Figure 18 of the SPD, which forms part of the wider guidance relating to rear parking courtyards. This section emphasises that such areas should benefit from adequate natural surveillance. An assessment of the submitted plans confirms the presence of several window openings at ground, first and second‐floor levels overlooking the proposed parking area. As a result, the courtyard would be subject to a high degree of passive surveillance from within the development.

Figure 18 also sets out the minimum dimensional requirements for rear parking courtyards. The plans indicate that each of the four proposed parking bays accords with the standard space dimensions referenced in the SPD. While the precise width of the proposed access point is not explicitly annotated, observations during my site visit confirmed that the existing access point is sufficiently wide to allow vehicular entry. Moreover, the submitted drawings clearly demonstrate that a vehicle would be able to manoeuvre through the proposed access into the courtyard.

Figure 18 of the SPD also identifies the minimum turning‐space requirements for rear parking courtyards. Although the submitted plans do not explicitly demonstrate compliance with these dimensions, attention is drawn to the [name] provided for each of the four proposed parking bays. The analyses for Bays one, two and three clearly show that a vehicle can enter the site, reverse into the designated bay, and subsequently exit the courtyard in a forward gear.

With regard to Bay four, its position within the courtyard necessitates a greater degree of manoeuvring compared with the other bays. While this would require additional spatial awareness to avoid conflict with other parked vehicles, the manoeuvre would not be inherently difficult. Importantly, the submitted swept‐path drawings confirm that the required movements can be undertaken safely within the confines of the forecourt.

In conclusion, the proposed development would accord with Policy L1 of the Dudley Borough Development Strategy 2017, as well as the relevant guidance contained within the SPD. Both the policy and the SPD require residential development on previously developed land to demonstrate safe and suitable access, adequate parking provision, and appropriate space for vehicle manoeuvring, ensuring that highway safety and the free flow of traffic are not compromised.

Schedule 7A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (as amended) (the Act) has introduced a statutory framework for [name]. The submitted UU aims to secure financial contributions towards a [name]. I consider that the measures in the UU are necessary, related directly to the development and fairly related in scale and kind. As such, they would accord with the provisions of Regulation 122 of the Community Infrastructure Levy Regulations 2010 and the tests for planning obligations set out in the Framework.

However, I have some concerns about the document itself, its execution and thus whether the Council could rely on it to secure the contribution. It is not signed by the parties, it is not dated, it contains missing information and does not include the plan referred to in Schedule 1. For these reasons, I am not satisfied that the submitted UU could be effectively relied upon to make adequate provision for the aforementioned contribution.

It is the responsibility of the parties to ensure that any planning obligation is both provided and complete. The Planning Inspectorate Procedural Guide: Planning appeals – England (updated 9 December 2025) is abundantly clear on this matter in chapter 18. It states that if an appeal is following the written representations procedure, the appellant must ensure that an executed and certified copy of this obligation is provided at the time of making their appeal. Furthermore, the procedural guide also makes it clear that a decision should not be delayed to await a revised obligation unless very exceptional circumstances exist. No such circumstances have been demonstrated in this case.

The Council have requested that in the event that the appeal was to be allowed, a condition is imposed to secure the financial contribution cited above along with a payment of the reasonable costs experienced by the Council. However, a planning permission cannot be granted subject to a planning obligation.

I am mindful, however, that the Planning Practice Guidance acknowledges that, in exceptional circumstances, a negatively worded condition requiring the completion of an obligation or agreement before development commences may be appropriate, but only where there is clear evidence that the delivery of the development would otherwise be placed at serious risk. In this case, no substantive or compelling evidence has been provided to demonstrate that the delivery of the scheme would be jeopardised in the absence of such a condition. Consequently, the exceptional circumstances necessary to justify securing the obligations by way of a planning condition do not exist.

In light of the above, the omissions noted in the submitted UU undermines the legal enforceability of the document and therefore, it would fail to secure the [name]. The absence of this monitoring contribution raises significant doubt that the proposal would comply with the requirements of Schedule 7A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. This procedural defect provides a reason to dismiss the appeal.

[name] have identified no harm or conflict with the development plan with regard to the proposed vehicle parking arrangement, as a decision maker, the obligation before me must be assessed as to whether it would provide the contributions it sets out and which are necessary to make the development acceptable. The obligation before me is incomplete. Consequently, the proposed development would conflict with Schedule 7A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, and no material considerations, including the Framework, outweigh this conflict. I therefore conclude that the appeal must be dismissed.