Appeal 6001817

The appeal is dismissed.

An application for costs was made by [name] and [name] against Winchester City Council. That is the subject of a separate decision.

In the above banner heading, I have utilised the description of development from the decision notice, as this is referred to in the appellants’ appeal submission and accurately describes the proposal. For clarity, the site address in the banner heading is taken from the application form.

Schedule 2, Part 20, Class ZA of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (the GPDO) permits, amongst other things, demolition of a single detached building together with its replacement by a single building, provided that the building was existing on 12 March 2020 and established for a purpose falling within Class B1 of the Schedule to the 1987 Order.

The main issue therefore is whether the proposed development benefits from the provisions of Class ZA of the GPDO; and if the proposal is found to constitute permitted development, whether prior approval would be required.

“The 1987 Order”, as referred to above, is defined under Class ZA as the [name] Order1 as in force on 12 March 2020. Therefore, whilst Use Class B1(a) has subsequently become Class E(g)(i)2, the relevant consideration for this appeal 1 the Town and Country Planning ([name]) Order 1987 2 Under the Town and Country Planning ([name]) (Amendment) (England) Regulations 2020 is Use Class B1(a). The Use Classes Order, as was in force on 12 March 2020, described Class B1(a) as “an office other than a use within class A2 (financial and professional services)”.

The appellants’ evidence indicates that the appeal building changed use from a timber store and tack room to a dog grooming parlour and an office. The exact change of use date is unknown. The application form advises that the building to be demolished has been vacant for at least six months immediately prior to the submission of the application on 21 March 2025, which the Council has not disputed. As the relevant established use date under Class ZA is 12 March 2020, the subsequent planning history details before me are not relevant considerations for this appeal.

The witness statement from the former owner and operator of the dog grooming premises sets out that the appeal building was used for administrative, client-facing and business operations between approximately 1999 and 2018. The building contained office space and a client reception, as clients were regularly received. The use also entailed appointment and record-keeping functions. Correspondence and bills were all addressed to the appeal building, and no equestrian or residential activities took place within it.

The existing floor plan before me indicates one office room, an office storage space, and two larger “business space” rooms. Neither the witness statement nor the other evidence before me set out the precise areas of the appeal building that were used for the administrative functions relating to the dog grooming business.

A significant proportion of the appeal building is not fully enclosed, as indicated on the existing floor plan, and which I observed during my site visit. I consider it unlikely that these open areas would have been capable of facilitating an office use.

I accept that even if a building contains a business with a customer-facing element, it could still fall within an office use if the customer-facing element is ancillary to the office use. This is because not every element of a business operation must align with the primary planning use classification.

However, regular client visits to the dog grooming premises indicate a probable Class A2 professional or other services use (as was in force on 12 March 2020), where the services are provided principally to visiting members of the public. Such use, combined with the administrative functions as described above, and the open areas of the appeal building, indicate a probable mixed (sui generis) use, not a primary Class B1(a) office use. As a matter of law, the planning use classification of a building cannot be both sui generis and Class B1(a).

My attention has also been drawn to records of non-domestic business rates and rateable values applicable to the appeal building between 2006 and 2018. This includes a reference to Class Clips Dog Grooming. However, these records relate to separate legislation from the planning acts, governing valuation and taxation. Therefore, such records do not in themselves substantiate an office use or other specific non-domestic use under the Use Classes Order.

I therefore conclude that on the balance of probabilities, the evidence before me is not sufficiently precise or unambiguous to adequately demonstrate that the appeal building was established on 12 March 2020 for a purpose falling within Class B1 of the Schedule to the 1987 Order. The proposal therefore does not benefit from the permitted development right set out in Schedule 2, Part 20, Class ZA of the GPDO.

The main parties agree that the proposal would not have conflicted with any of the restrictions or limitations set out in paragraph ZA1. Based on the submitted evidence and my site visit observations, I have no reason to disagree.

As considerations as to whether prior approval would be required form a follow-on condition stage under paragraph ZA.2, they can therefore only apply if the development is otherwise permitted development. [name] have found that the proposal would fail to constitute permitted development, there is no need for me to consider whether prior approval is required, as this could not lead me to a different decision.

Reference is made to other approved applications as “planning precedent”, comprising one local example and further afield cases at Elmbridge Council, Cornwall, Warwick, Stratford-on-Avon, Hertfordshire and Babergh and Mid Suffolk Council. Those would have all however turned on their specific circumstances, and I have determined the appeal based on its own circumstances having regard to the evidence before me. My attention is also drawn to three appeal decisions3. However, in each of those cases, the relevant use of the appeal building was not in dispute. The above examples therefore do not justify allowing this appeal.

For the reasons given, the appeal is dismissed.