Appeal 6002064

The appeal is dismissed.

An application for an award of costs against the Council is the subject of a separate decision.

The appeal site is a secondary school with external sports facilities, including a floodlit football pitch (the pitch) and multi-use games area (the MUGA). The former is restricted to school use only and may not be floodlit after 18.30 on weekdays. The latter may not be floodlit after 21.00 on weekdays or 16.00 otherwise.

The effect of the appeal scheme would be to permit non-school related use of the pitch between 18.00 and 21.30 on weekdays and between 09.00 and 16.30 otherwise. Floodlighting could operate until 21.00 on weekdays and 16.30 otherwise. Floodlighting of the MUGA could continue until 16.30 at weekends.

The Council accepts that the appeal scheme would not have harmful effects upon the highway network. Based on the submissions I see no reason to take a different view.

Given the above, the main issue is the effect of the appeal scheme on the living conditions of neighbours, with particular regard to noise.

The submissions distinguish between general noise levels and maximums (Lmax). Notwithstanding the appellant’s observations as to the nature and limitations of assessing the latter, a sports pitch is likely to result in both a general level of noise and in isolated shouts, ball impacts, and whistles, any or all of which may be distinguishable. I therefore assess the appeal scheme in both respects.

Turning firstly to general noise levels; A Noise Impact Assessment (NIA) by Buro Happold1 includes a monitoring exercise in which the existing ambient noise levels at the nearest neighbouring boundary were found to be 49dB on weekday evenings and 48dB during the day at the weekend. An earlier version of the NIA put these levels at 68dB and 61dB respectively, figures questioned by the Council at that time.

Even if I accept that the above may have undermined the Council’s confidence in the NIA, ambient noise levels were ultimately identified using a process and equipment described within the NIA. The Council have given me little reason to doubt the veracity of the method or the final figures, and I see none for myself.

The final version of the NIA applies a different threshold for noise acceptability than the earlier version. Contrary to the Council’s assertion, however, I do not find the final threshold figures to lack objective justification; The NIA sets out the reference codes and standards upon which it is based, and the threshold figures regarding acceptable internal ambient noise levels are from World Health Organisation guidelines and [name].

Whilst the Council tells me that guidance from Sport England2 cited in the NIA is too general to provide a detailed understanding of how the appeal scheme may affect neighbours, a point acknowledged by the appellant, the NIA relies upon a wider sweep of the cited codes and standards in establishing acceptable noise thresholds. I have very little from the Council as to why these thresholds should, given their sources, be considered inappropriate and see none for myself. The NIA uses recorded noise levels from the pitch rather than modelled predictions, and I have been given no reason to think it is unreliable in that respect. 1 Revision 3, dated 24 June 2025. 2 Sport England: [name] (AGPs) Acoustics Planning Implications Guide (August 2015 Revision 001).

Taking all of the above into account, I find no reason to doubt the finding of the NIA that the increase in general noise levels brought about by the appeal scheme would be sufficiently modest as to cause no harm.

Turning now to Lmax levels; The NIA finds that the façade of the nearest residential properties, those being flats at [address], would experience Lmax levels of 68dB. I note the Council’s concerns that this figure does not recognise the height of that building but have little reason to doubt it is at least a reasonable indication of Lmax levels, as measured in dB.

The NIA finds that once an adjustment of 15dB is applied, that being the appropriate calculation to reflect partially open windows, Lmax levels inside the nearest residential properties would be 53dB, and that this would be acceptable. Though the Council contends that insufficient justification has been provided for the latter finding, the NIA refers to Building Regulations Approved Document O, which cites Lmax levels of 55 dB as an acceptable maximum even between 23.00 and 07.00. I have very little from the Council to show that this is an inappropriate point of reference, or that the anticipated Lmax dB levels would equate to unacceptable harm.

That said, Lmax noise may cause harm which cannot be adequately reflected in a measurement of dB alone. Such considerations are pertinent to the appeal scheme given the particular qualities and intermittent nature of the noises likely to come from the pitch. Moreover, the point is fundamental to the Council’s objections.

I recognise that, as the Council has it, there is no guidance available to confidently assess the impact of maximum noise levels during the evening period or, as the appellant has it, no substantial scientific evidence to distinguish between a disruptive maximum noise event and one that is not.

Even so, it nevertheless rests with the appellant to demonstrate that the scheme would not cause unacceptable harm; As set out in the supporting text to Policy D13 of the London Plan (2021) (The London Plan) the ‘Agent of Change’ principle places the responsibility for mitigating the impact of noise and other nuisances firmly on the new development.

The NIA does not employ a discreet weighting or penalty to reflect impacts from Lmax events that cannot be reflected in dB alone. The appellant considers the Council’s contention, that such an approach would be unfavourable to the scheme, to be unsubstantiated. They do not, however, give any indication of how applying such penalties could fail to be unfavourable. It is not obvious to me that it could, even if the effect was not determinative.

There is little direction from the Council on how such penalties could be incorporated in an assessment, and I note the appellant’s observation that they are familiar with the use of such methods in assessing industrial and commercial noise rather than noise from a sports pitch. Even so, I have little evidence that the application of penalties for Lmax noise could not, at least in broad terms, be deployed when assessing the impacts of the appeal scheme.

In any event, I find little within the NIA to show that a reliable method of assessing Lmax noise, beyond a measurement in dB, has been used. The findings at Table 3-7 are set out in dB terms alone. Beyond this, considerations of Lmax noise are limited to a recommendation that whistle use be restricted.

This would no doubt be a sensible precaution, not least because the whistles used during the NIA monitoring period might not be as loud as those used during a sports fixture. Overall, however, this lone recommendation does little to address Lmax noise as (firstly) whistles, potentially including louder ones as identified by the Council, would still be used at weekends and (secondly) the NIA found whistles did not, in any event, contribute to maxima noise events.

On the second point, though the NIA suggests recorded Lmax noise came from sources other than whistles, those sources are not identified or addressed. Furthermore, the recommendation does not evidently wrestle with the likelihood that in the absence of a whistle a very loud shout or other equally invasive sound, which may itself be a source of Lmax noise, would likely be necessary to control proceedings on the pitch.

The appeal scheme does not include acoustic barriers or other mitigation of that type. The rationale for this is that the NIA demonstrates such mitigation to be unnecessary. Whilst that may be true in respect of general noise levels, I have little before me to suggest it could not be effective in addressing Lmax noise.

I attach little weight to the appellant’s argument that the noise characteristics of the pitch are not new to the area; The use of the pitch in the evenings and weekends would be new, and I see little reason to find that any resulting impacts would be felt less keenly simply because they already occur on schooldays.

The ambient noise levels in the NIA were established when the nearby rugby club was out of season, and they may be higher when the club is in use. Even so, the club is some distance away from the homes nearest the pitch, and I have no evidence that, when operational, it would alter either ambient noise levels or local Lmax noise in such a way as to make the appeal scheme unimpactful.

I recognise that the NIA is based, at points, upon presumed worst-case scenarios and a conservative approach to noise level thresholds. In the main, however, that approach informs the part of the assessment that is based on dB measurements, rather than Lmax noise.

There is an absence of available sports pitches in the area. On one hand, the appeal scheme would make a positive contribution in that respect. On the other, this suggests that regular use would be made of the pitch, underlining the need for certainty over noise impacts. The National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) recognises that opportunities for sport and physical activity is important for the health and well-being of communities. It also, however, requires development to create places that promote health and well-being with a high standard of amenity for existing and future users. I see little reason why the benefits of the scheme should outweigh its potential harms, and attach only modest weight to the former.

I have considered the appellant’s suggestion that a year-long temporary permission be issued so that noise could be monitored and any requirement for mitigation measures established. However, I have very little to show me how Lmax noise would be measured or, more pertinently, what mitigation may be used if it is established to be harmful. I see little justification, therefore, in exposing residents to the risk of harm for a year.

Ultimately, given the hours of use proposed, the year-round durability of the artificial surface, and the presence of floodlights, the scheme could well result in the pitch being in all but constant use every day of the week and until reasonably late in the evenings on weekdays. It could well be in use when neighbours are most likely to be resting or enjoying leisure time at home, and when a reasonably peaceful environment is most valued. The scheme therefore has the inherent potential to cause significant adverse noise impacts on health and quality of life.

As made explicit in the decision notice, refusal resulted from a perceived failure to demonstrate that no adverse noise impacts would occur, rather than because the Council identified that such impacts certainly would occur. [name] have stated above, this is in line with the ‘Agent of Change’ principle, which places the onus on the appellant.

In this context, given my findings above, and whilst I acknowledge the challenges involved in measuring harm from Lmax noise, I am not satisfied that the appellant has demonstrated the appeal scheme would not cause harm in that respect. It is not evident therefore that the appeal scheme satisfies the requirements of Policy 119 of the Bromley Local Plan (2019) and Policies D13 and D14 of the London Plan, where they aim to protect residential amenity.

The appeal is dismissed.