Appeal 6002419

The appeal is dismissed.

The appeal scheme was described on the planning application form as “proposed drop kerb and crossover public footpath”. A different description was used on the decision notice and subsequently on the appellant’s statement; I have used that wording in the banner heading above as it provides a fuller description of the scheme.

The main issues are the effect of the proposed development on: • The provision of on-street car parking spaces, support for use of sustainable means of transport, and pedestrian safety; and • The character and appearance of the area, including with regard to effects on biodiversity.

The appeal property is an end terrace dwellinghouse and its garden; it is on the north-west side of [address], a U-shaped street in a predominantly residential area. The proposed development is the creation of a 3.6m wide dropped kerb and footway crossover, the removal of part of the existing front boundary fence, and the replacement part of the existing soft landscaping within the front garden with a hardstanding parking area.

Policy Q14 of the 2021 Lambeth Local Plan (“the LLP”) deals with development in gardens; among other things, it says that front gardens are not considered appropriate for development, and that car parking in these locations will only be permitted for [name] holders where a [name] parking space cannot be accommodated on-street within an acceptable distance. There is nothing before me to indicate that the proposed off-street parking space would be for a [name] holder, and the development would not therefore comply with this policy.

The appeal site is in a location with a public transport accessibility level (“PTAL”) of 2, indicating moderate public transport accessibility. For such locations, Policy T6 of the LLP sets a maximum (my emphasis) residential car parking standard of 0.25 spaces per dwelling; the provision of a dedicated off-street parking space for the appeal property would exceed this standard. It would also support and encourage the use of the private car, rather than more sustainable means of transport, by the occupiers of the appeal property.

The provision of the footway crossover would result in the loss of one or, more likely, two kerbside spaces used for general public car parking. [address] is not within a controlled parking zone nor, as far as I am aware, are there plans to introduce one. In this respect, it appears something of an anomaly in the area; as I saw during my site visit, parking on [address], the only street to which [address] is connected (and on other nearby streets off [address]) is controlled by permit1. I note that during three periods of observations during October 2025 the appellant found between two and six on-street spaces available on [address], though this availability was not expressed in terms of the percentage of total spaces.

During my own site visit (carried out at around lunchtime on a Thursday afternoon), there appeared to be no more than three or four safe and legal parking spaces available within [address] appeared, though I recognise that this is very much an unscientific snapshot. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the area is one where the loss of two publicly available (albeit not formally designated) on-street spaces would be likely to increase parking stress.

The Council indicated that it had concerns about the lack of pedestrian visibility splays for the proposed vehicular access, in part because the hedge along the appeal property’s side boundary would, at around 2m high, limit intervisibility between drivers and passing pedestrians. This specific point was not substantively addressed in the appellant’s evidence. I recognise that vehicle movements into and out of the site would be likely to be relatively infrequent, of short duration, and would be expected to take place at low speeds, but even so there is not sufficient information before me to demonstrate that they would not have an unacceptable adverse impact on pedestrian safety.

I conclude that the proposed development would have an adverse impact on the provision of on-street car parking spaces and support for use of sustainable means of transport, and it has not been demonstrated that there would be no unacceptable adverse impact on pedestrian safety. As such, it would conflict with Policies Q14 and T6 of the LLP, the principal relevant provisions of which I have set out above. It would also conflict with Policies T1, T2 and Q15 of the LLP which together, and among other things, seek to reduce dependence on the private car, to improve conditions for pedestrians, and which require boundary treatments flanking a vehicle crossover to not exceed 0.9m in height so as to maintain adequate sight lines. 1 [name] saw indicates that some of the streets are not public and so have privately-controlled parking rather than falling within the Council’s permit schemes.

[address] is characterised by a mix of blocks of houses, such as that including the appeal property, and three-storey blocks of flats. Houses generally have planted front gardens with a variety of boundary treatments including hedges, timber fences, and low brick or blockwork walls. Where there is planting, the greenery makes a very positive contribution to the character and appearance of the area.

None of the houses within the street appeared to have private off-street parking within their front garden. This is also a positive characteristic of the street, presenting a favourable contrast with some otherwise similar neighbourhoods of my experience where front boundaries have often been removed and gardens hard surfaced. Rather than the parking of vehicles in such a manner becoming “a cornerstone aspect which has ingrained the sense of place of towns and cities countrywide”, as the appellant suggests, in my experience more often than not it has led to the streetscape taking on a harsh and car-dominated appearance.

I acknowledge that the frontage of the appeal property is not significant in any heritage terms. However, the loss of soft-landscaping and a relatively recent smart, if unexceptional, boundary fence, as well as the increased visual dominance of the private car which the development would signal, would be detrimental to the established character and appearance of the area. The appellant noted that the relevant policies of the development plan do not preclude development which would “pioneer a form of development”; as a point of principle, I agree, but this does not justify unacceptable harm which might arise as a consequence.

The Council considered that the removal of planting would also lead to a harmful loss of biodiversity. The appellant suggested that, in the event of my allowing the appeal, pre-commencement conditions could be used to secure a biodiversity assessment and, if necessary, the implementation of mitigating measures. I acknowledge the proposal relates to a relatively small area of a domestic front garden, and it may be that (as the appellant argues) its effects would be “inconsequential” as far as biodiversity is concerned. However, even if I were satisfied that this particular point could be addressed in this way, my overall concerns about the visual impact of the development would remain.

I conclude that the proposed development would cause unacceptable harm to the character and appearance of the area. It would therefore conflict with Policies Q5, Q14 and Q15 of the LLP which together, and among other things, seek to ensure that development sustains and reinforces local distinctiveness (including in respect of boundary treatments), and that development in gardens does not harm visual amenity or biodiversity.

The appellant has argued that individual elements of the scheme, such as the creation of a permeable hardstanding would not require planning permission. That may well be so, but my role in determining this appeal is to assess the whole of the proposed development as it was applied for; I have done this, and found harm as I have described above. It would be open to the appellant to make applications under sections 191 or 192 of the Act in respect of other potentially lawful development, if they so wished; the determination of any such applications would be independent of my decision in this appeal.

For the reasons given above the appeal should be dismissed.