Appeal 6002564

The appeal is dismissed.

As referenced above, the application form says that the proposed change of use is from Class C3 (dwellinghouses) to a Class C2 (respite care)1 - with reference to the Town and Country Planning ([name]) Order 1987 (as amended). In the Order, Class C2 is actually labelled ‘residential institutions’ and is defined to include use for the provision of residential accommodation and care to people in need of care. It does not specifically refer to respite care. The proposal would provide short term respite care for children and young people aged 0 – 25 with learning disabilities or other issues, for periods of up to a couple of weeks at a time. The Council considers that the proposed use would not fall within Class C2 because of the short term nature of the occupation and would instead be sui generis - in a class of its own. It is not crucial to my assessment whether the proposal falls within Class C2 or is sui generis. I have considered the appeal on the basis of the details provided.

The main issues are: i) Whether a need for respite care justifies the loss of a residential unit suitable for occupation by families; and ii) The effect on living conditions at neighbouring properties, in terms of potential noise and disturbance. 1 The application form also includes supplementary text that goes beyond a simple description of the proposed development. That extra text has been left out of the heading, but taken into account in determining the appeal.

[site address] is a small, mid-terrace, 3 bedroom house on a residential street. Policy TP35 of the Birmingham Development Plan (BDP) aims to make best use of the existing dwelling stock, in part by restricting changes to other uses. The Council’s Housing and Economic Development Needs Assessment (HEDNA) confirms that the Council is not currently meeting the city’s housing needs, particularly for family properties. There is therefore a justifiable need to protect the existing stock of housing suitable for families.

Although the proposed respite use is to some extent residential in character, its care element and short term nature clearly distinguish it from most residential uses. I consider this to be a change of use restricted by policy TP35 unless, in the terms of that policy, there are good planning justifications and/or an identified social need for the proposed use.

Policy DM12 of the Development Management in Birmingham Development Plan Document (DMB) encourages the development of specialist accommodation including care homes and supported accommodation for people with mental health issues, learning disabilities and other issues. Policy DM12’s support for such development effectively acknowledges a general social need. It does also, however, balance this objective with an aim to prevent the loss of existing uses that make an important contribution to the Council’s objectives, such as family housing.

The appellant asserts that there is a well-documented local and national need for short term respite care. The appellant refers to the HEDNA, but cites no specific evidence regarding the need for respite care in Birmingham. The only actual evidence of need put forward is a letter from the Sandwell Children’s Trust stating that there is a significant gap in the market for overnight respite provision within Sandwell and several of the neighbouring boroughs. That letter does not, however, make any clear reference to a need in Birmingham City Council’s area.

On the other hand, Birmingham Children’s Trust (BCT) advises that it does not have a requirement for short breaks for under 18s as it has 4 of its own homes to support this need plus a range of other short break options in family settings. I consider this to be the best available evidence regarding the need for respite care for children in Birmingham. The BCT does not deal with 18 – 25 year olds so has no comment to make in that regard, but the lack of any specific evidence of need for that age group indicates that there may not be any strong need there either.

Taking all this into account, I conclude that there is no demonstrable social need for a new respite care facility such as to justify the loss of a residential unit suitable for occupation by families. The proposal therefore conflicts with BDP policy TP35, DMB policy DM12 and the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework), which taken together aim to conserve and make efficient use of the existing housing stock. The Council also refers to BDP policy TP30 here, but that policy deals with new housing development so does not seem directly relevant to this issue.

The appellant indicates that No 25 it would be used for up to 4 people at any one time (2 residents and 2 staff). Although a similar number of people might live in the house if used as a family dwelling, the short term nature of the stays, with extra comings and goings for staff, is significantly different to a normal residential use. The house’s modest dimensions and mid-terrace location mean that it is close up against residential uses to either side. I have not seen any management plan or other convincing details to show that the property could be adequately managed to avoid excessive noise and disturbance to the immediate neighbours in this relatively quiet neighbourhood. Although such a plan could be required by condition, I am doubtful that any measures taken would be satisfactory in this tightly constrained situation. I recognise that the respite care facility would be regulated under other, non-planning, legislation, but do not find this to be a sufficient safeguard in relation to this issue.

I conclude that the proposal would unduly harm living conditions at neighbouring properties due to potential noise and disturbance. It therefore conflicts in this respect with DMB policies DM2 and DM12, the Birmingham Design Guide Supplementary Planning Document and the Framework, which taken together aim to ensure that developments do not result in unacceptable adverse impacts on neighbours’ amenity.

I find that the proposal conflicts with the development plan. For the reasons set out above, and having regard to all other matters raised, I conclude that the appeal should not succeed.