Appeal 6002889

The appeal is dismissed.

The appellant has submitted a revised plan as part of the appeal. This shows a reduction in the proposed amount of glazing to the conversion scheme. This amended plan does not involve a substantial difference or fundamental change. Due to the nature of the changes and that the Council has had the opportunity to review the plan, I am satisfied that taking it into account would not cause procedural unfairness to anyone involved in the appeal. As such, I have accepted the amended plan.

The main issues are: • whether the appeal site would be a suitable location for the proposed development, having regard to local and national policy, and accessibility to services and facilities; and the effect of the proposed development on: • the supply of small employment sites; • the remaining farm enterprise; and • the character and appearance of the area.

The appeal site forms part of a wider complex of buildings including a traditional farmhouse and barn, more modern agricultural buildings, areas of hardstanding, dog kennels and what appeared to be a residential conversion of a stone barn. Located outside any identified settlement within the Stroud District Local Plan (November 2015) (SDLP), for planning purposes the site is within the open countryside.

In order to protect the separate identity of settlements and the quality of the countryside, SDLP Policy CP15 restricts development outside settlements and provides 6 exceptions. The first of these exceptions is relevant and relates to proposals being essential to the maintenance or enhancement of a sustainable farming or forestry enterprise within the District.

Paragraph 84 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) seeks to avoid the development of isolated homes in the countryside unless one or more of given circumstances apply. Parts a), b) and c) cover an essential need for a rural worker, representing the optimal viable use of a heritage asset, and the re-use of redundant or disused buildings and enhance its immediate setting respectively.

It is the appellants’ intention to occupy the proposed dwelling and sell the farmhouse, which it is claimed is in need of modernisation, a financial burden on the existing farm business and described as a ‘traditional (heritage) farmhouse’. The appellants anticipate that the selling of the farmhouse would release capital for the proposed conversion and reinvestment in the core farming business.

However, limited information, including that of a financial nature, has been provided to demonstrate that the proposal and the related chain of events are essential to maintain or enhance the existing farming enterprise. Moreover, the existing farmhouse already provides accommodation for the appellants.

It had not been identified by the Council that the Farmhouse is a non-designated heritage asset (NDHA). I saw that the farmhouse is a pleasant vernacular property, but in the absence of sound evidence on this particular matter and from my own observations, I do not consider it to be a NDHA.

I saw that the appeal buildings were neither redundant nor disused as they were storing machinery, including tractors and diggers, as well as a modest quantity of hay bales. Although the storage capacity of the building was not at its full potential, it was in use.

There is no dispute between the parties that [site address] , which contains a number of services and facilities, is at a distance of approximately 900m from the appeal site. I found the route a long, narrow and, in places, steep and uneven road with no street lighting or footpath. It had been raining prior to my visit and there was also a noticeable amount of mud on the roads. These road conditions would not be an attractive option for cyclists and walkers and those with mobility issues, particularly during adverse weather and during the hours of darkness. Little information is before me on public transport provision in the area. Due to a lack of genuine sustainable travel choices, the occupants of the proposed dwelling would be heavily reliant on private motor vehicles, which could be electric, to access services and facilities on a regular basis, and I find the site to be isolated from a settlement.

I appreciate the appellant’s intention that the occupation of the proposed dwelling would provide a home-work function, and it could be tied to an agricultural holding by a [name] (UU), of which there is a draft copy before me. Nevertheless, the result of the proposal would be the existing farmhouse, which currently serves this function, being sold. There would still be a net increase in dwellings in this location. As such, this has not swayed me away from my findings.

Consequently, I have found that the proposed development fails to comply with Policy CP15 or paragraph 84 of the Framework.

For these reasons, I conclude that the appeal site is not a suitable location for the proposed development, having regard to local and national policy, and accessibility to services and facilities. This is contrary to [name] CP1 and CP13, CP14 and CP15. Collectively, these seek to, amongst other things; reflect the presumption in favour of sustainable development contained in the Framework; restrict development outside settlements to those that meet the listed exceptions; provide choice in the mode of transport available; and minimise the distance people need to travel.

Contained within the wider complex of buildings, is a dog kennelling operation, which was part of a farm diversification scheme to provide additional income to the farm enterprise. The proposed development would see the removal of the existing dog kennels and associated outbuildings, with the land returned to paddock.

[name] recognise that the dog kennels employ some casual labour at peak times and the appellants can choose to close the business, there is limited information before me that the business could not continue operating in a different manner, such as with a different manager or operator. I found that the dog kennels were located within a well-contained area on the southern edge of the wider complex with a clear vehicular route through the farmyard. Accordingly, no compelling case has been made for the loss of this small employment site.

It is asserted that the closure of the dog kennels and the demolition of the associated buildings would improve the openness of the area, as well as remove employment and client-based travel, and potential noise issues from the site. However, these existing buildings are seen within the existing cluster of structures in the courtyard, and there is a lack of detail surrounding traffic and noise generated from the use. Therefore, these matters do not lead me away from my findings on this issue.

In conclusion the proposed development would have an unacceptable effect on the supply of small employment sites. I have found conflict with SDLP Policy EI3 which protects small employment sites from non-employment uses such as housing unless wholly exceptional circumstances can be demonstrated.

SDLP Policy EI5 supports farm diversification where proposals can demonstrate the viability of farming through helping to support, rather than replace or prejudice, farming activities on the rest of the farm and promotes the uses of farming practices that have a positive impact on the environment. Paragraph 5.44 of the supporting text to this policy highlights that the change of use of an existing building to a non-agricultural use, which subsequently gives rise to demand for a new building to meet the original need, will not be supported. An exception to this is where there is clear evidence of changing farming practices that can justify further expansion or change.

During my site visit I saw that there were numerous buildings of varying sizes within the complex being predominantly used for agricultural storage, in addition to areas of hardstanding with some outdoor storage. [name] note claims that the buildings have been underused, operations have changed and the holding is smaller, limited information has been presented that the appeal buildings, which are currently in use, are surplus to requirement and that the needs of the farm can be adequately accommodated within the remaining buildings. Moreover, there is little information before me that the resulting loss of income from the dog kennels, would not undermine the viability of the existing farm enterprise.

Consequently, I cannot conclude with reasonable certainty that the proposed development would not adversely impact upon the ongoing viability of the farm or lead to the demand for a new building to meet the needs currently met by the appeal buildings.

As such, I conclude that the proposed development would have an unacceptable effect on the remaining farm enterprise, contrary to SDLP Policy EI5.

Positioned in close proximity to other structures, the appeal buildings are seen as part of the wider complex, consisting of a mixture of traditional and more modern buildings. The steel framed dutch barn and lean-to, subject to the appeal, consist of blockwork, profiled metal sheet cladding and some open elements. The proposed conversion would include replacement insulated profiled metal cladding and the incorporation of glazing and timber cladding to the existing openings.

Views of the appeal buildings are restricted from [address], and the visual impact of the external alterations would be limited. Its modest domestic appearance would generally only be perceptible from within the farmyard.

Therefore, the proposed development would have an acceptable effect on the character and appearance of the area, according with SDLP Policy CP15, which includes support for developments that are of an appropriate design and appearance that respect their surroundings.

An unchallenged claim by the Council locates the appeal site within the [name] area (CC) for the Severn Estuary Special Area of Conservation / Special Protection Area (SAC/SPA). This is a European Site as defined in the Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2017 (as amended).

The SAC/SPA hosts internationally important populations of several species of waterbirds. The conservation objectives are to ensure that the integrity of the site is maintained or restored as appropriate and ensure that the site contributes to achieving Favourable Conservation Status of its [name] and Species. One of the pathways of impact currently affecting the SAC/SPA is noted to be recreational pressure from visiting the site.

Mitigation has been developed for the SAC/SPA, including Suitable Alternative Natural Greenspace and [name] and Monitoring mitigations. These seek to meet the conservation objectives by reducing recreational pressure and would be funded by proportionate financial contributions from new residential development that fall within the CC.

It is common ground between the parties that a UU would be required to secure a financial contribution to mitigate any likely significant effects of the development on the integrity of the SAC/SPA. Whilst the appellant refers to a UU, such a legal agreement covering this matter is not before me. Nevertheless, as I have found the appeal scheme would be unacceptable for other reasons, it is not necessary for me to consider whether there would be any likely significant effects on the integrity of this European Site or undertake an Appropriate Assessment.

Personal benefits to the appellants are also identified and supported by correspondence from a doctor. The new dwelling would provide a single level farmhouse, more suited to their age and mobility issues and thereby future proofing their ability to remain living at [address] and continuing the farm business for the foreseeable future.

I recognise that the failure of this appeal could lead to the appellants being unable to find a suitable home to meet their needs, which would engage the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) contained in section 149 of the Equality Act 2010 and Article 8 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Disability and age are relevant protected characteristics to which the PSED applies. These rights are engaged in reaching my decision. However, they are qualified rights and interference may be justified where in the public interest. The concept of proportionality is key.

Whilst noting the claims surrounding the cost of the upkeep of the farmhouse, there is little evidence to demonstrate this and that suitable accommodation could not be provided elsewhere, including within the existing dwelling, where it would not result in the harms I have identified above. In having regard to the PSED, the adverse effects of dismissing the appeal on persons with protected characteristics would, on the basis of the evidence before me, be proportionate in this instance when balanced against the well-established and legitimate planning purposes of national and local planning policies. Moreover, dismissal of the appeal would not unacceptably violate family rights under Article 8 of the HRA.

There is evidence before me that a previous application under Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended) (GPDO) on the appeal site was refused. A fallback position in the form of an appeal against this decision, or a new Class Q application, which is claimed would be a multi-unit proposal, has been presented in support of the appeal, However, the appellants acknowledge that there is technically, at the date of this appeal, no fallback position to an existing consent. There are limited details of the refused scheme or a new scheme before me, and I am unable to undertake a full and detailed comparison with the appeal scheme. Additionally, whilst recognising the appellant’s intentions for the dog kennels, there is no compelling evidence that the fallback position is a greater than theoretical possibility, or that if the current appeal is dismissed the fallback would be pursued. Consequently, I find the suggested fallback position to have little weight in the determination of the appeal.

I note the appellants’ reference to a permission1 where it is claimed that the Council took a pragmatic approach. Nevertheless, I have found this to be materially different to the appeal scheme before me as it related to alterations to an extant Class Q approval where works had commenced. 1 Planning Ref: S.24/2304/FUL

Whilst the inclusion of Class Q within the GPDO indicates that the Government supports the principle of the conversion of agricultural buildings to dwellings, this is subject to specific limitations and conditions given in the relevant legislation. This was the case with an appeal decision2 submitted in support of the appeal scheme. However, applications for full planning permission, as in this case, are subject to consideration against policies contained in the development plan as well as material considerations, including the Framework. The Government has clearly expressed through national policy that development should be directed to sustainable locations. The existence of Class Q is not therefore a compelling justification for the proposal subject to this appeal and I have determined the appeal before me accordingly and on its individual planning merits.

Annex 3 of the Framework identifies that previously developed land (PDL) excludes land that is or was last occupied by agricultural buildings. As the appeal relates to existing agricultural buildings it does not meet the definition of PDL.

In the absence of a mechanism to secure the dwelling as self-build, I am unable to give weight to this factor.

A lack of harm or policy compliance, in respect of highway safety, ecology, flood risk, contamination, and the living conditions of neighbours would have a neutral effect which neither weigh for nor against the proposal

The Framework states that due weight should be given to relevant policies in existing plans according to their degree of consistency with the Framework. I give significant weight to the conflicts with [name] CP1, CP13, CP14, EI3 and EI5, which are consistent with the Framework in seeking sustainable development, promoting sustainable transport and supporting a prosperous rural economy.

There is no disagreement between the parties that the Council currently does not have a 5-year supply of deliverable housing sites. The Council’s stated figure of 3.24 years supply has not been challenged. Consequently, paragraph 11 d) of the Framework is applicable. Paragraph 11 d) ii) identifies that planning permission should be granted unless any adverse impact of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in the Framework taken as a whole, having particular regard to key policies including directing development to sustainable locations.

Whilst there is synergy between SDLP Policy CP15 and the Framework in terms of avoiding isolated homes in the countryside, considering the lack of a 5-year housing land supply, the weight I afford to this conflict is limited. Nevertheless, due to the conflict with [name] CP1, CP13 CP14, EI3 and EI5, I find that there is conflict with the development plan as a whole.

The proposed development would make a positive contribution in the delivery of an accessible dwelling that would meet the needs of the appellants’ personal circumstances and utilise existing buildings. There would also be associated social and economic benefits during the period of construction and once the dwelling is occupied. 2 Appeal Decision Ref: APP/C1625/W/21/3284309

The limited scale of the development means that I afford the provision of a new house, within the context of the current shortfall, along with the other benefits listed above, moderate weight in favour of the proposal.

On the other side of the balance, the proposed development would not be located in a suitable location, having regard to local and national policy, and accessibility to services and facilities, and there would be an unacceptable effect on the supply of small employment sites and the remaining farm enterprise. This would be contrary to paragraphs 84, 88, 110 and 115 of the Framework. Given the long-lasting nature of such effects, I attribute significant weight to this conflict.

Therefore, I conclude that the adverse impacts of the proposal would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits when assessed against the policies in the Framework taken as a whole. As such the presumption in favour of sustainable development set out in paragraph 11 d) of the Framework does not apply.

The proposal conflicts with the development plan as a whole and the material considerations, including the Framework, do not indicate that the appeal should be decided other than in accordance with it. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.