Appeal 6003117

The appeal is dismissed.

The site visit was undertaken by a representative of the Inspector whose recommendation is set out below and to which the Inspector has had regard before deciding the appeal.

On the day of the site visit, I observed that the side garage, outbuilding and small outrigger at the property had been demolished. However, I found no substantive evidence to indicate that the development as proposed in this appeal had commenced.

The main issue is whether the proposal would be granted planning permission by Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part 1, Class A of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (the GPDO).

The proposal comprises three enlargements of the dwelling. One is shown on the rear of a side garage which has since been demolished. The second is shown to the rear of the main house and the side of a single storey outrigger, and the third is shown to the rear of the outrigger, which has also since been demolished.

In its assessment of the proposal, the Council considered the three proposed enlargements as a singular rear extension, on the basis that they are not separated by a material gap of 0.5m or more. Although the Council contends that precedent for this approach has been established by caselaw, I am neither aware of such Appeal Planning Officer 6003117 caselaw nor have I been directed to it by either party. Furthermore, no reference to such a separation distance is made in either the provisions of Class A of the GPDO or the Government’s guidance set out in ‘Permitted development rights for householders technical guidance’. Therefore, it has not been demonstrated that the lack of a 0.5m gap between each proposed enlargement means that they must collectively be considered as a singular rear extension.

The conditions, limitations and restrictions of Class A of the GPDO also make no provision for a test of whether enlargements should be considered ‘meaningful’ or not in terms of their size and future use, and therefore it has not been demonstrated that any part of the proposal can be disregarded from consideration under Class A.

The application was made as a prior notification under the condition set out in A.4 of the GPDO, a process which only applies to development permitted by Class A which exceeds the limits in paragraph A.1(f) but is allowed by paragraph A.1.(g) of the GPDO. The enlargement proposed to the rear of the former side garage would be well separated from the other two enlargements, being to the rear of the garage rather than on the rear of the main property. It would not extend by more than 4m beyond the rear wall of either the garage or the detached dwellinghouse. Therefore, irrespective of whether that garage was part of the original dwellinghouse or not, that part of the proposal is not subject to the prior notification process as it falls within paragraph A.1(f) and not A.1(g). Therefore, I have not considered it further as part of this appeal.

The remaining two enlargements are not proposed to connect by way of a wall, as the rear wall of the outrigger is shown between the two. However, they are shown on plan P- 01.02 [name] with a single flat roof extending across both elements, replacing the pitched roof over the outrigger. It is therefore difficult to see how they could be constructed independently, as the appellant suggests. Instead, these elements of the proposal would be physically connected and merged with each other through the shared roof. For these reasons, these elements must be considered as a single enlargement for the purposes of the GPDO. As the depth of the proposed enlargement is greater than 4m, it falls within paragraph A.1(g) and is therefore subject to the prior notification process.

From the 1947 imagery provided by the appellant, I can see that properties on [address] were consistent in having a rear outrigger, the scale and location of which are very similar to the demolished outrigger at the appeal site. Although the image provides less clarity in relation to the appeal site, due to shading and overlayed annotations, the shape of an outrigger can still be discerned to the rear of the appeal property. On the balance of probability, therefore, I find that the outrigger at the appeal site was part of the original dwelling as it existed on 1st July 1948.

Accordingly, in the context that it constitutes a single rear enlargement by virtue of its shared flat roof, the proposed development would extend beyond a side wall of the original dwellinghouse, that being the side wall of the outrigger.

The dimensions provided on the drawings show that the width of the proposed rear enlargement would be greater than half the width of the dwellinghouse, even if the side garage were included. Therefore, whether or not the garage was part of the original dwellinghouse is not determinative for this appeal. Even if the side garage Appeal Planning Officer 6003117 was original, the proposed rear enlargement would have a width greater than half the width of the original dwellinghouse. Consequently, the development would not comply with A.1(j) and therefore would not be granted planning permission by Article 3, Schedule 2, Part 1, Class A of the GPDO.

The appellant has provided information about other examples of extensions in the area, as well as separate consents on the appeal site. However, this appeal is a technical assessment against the conditions, limitations and restrictions of Class A of the GPDO and is determined by the particular circumstances of the site. There is no substantive evidence that these other extensions are directly comparable to the scheme before me, or that they were considered under the same procedure and circumstances as this scheme. Consequently, they do not demonstrate that the appeal scheme complies with the GPDO.

Despite the delay in the Council uploading their delegated officer’s report, I am satisfied that this report was received by the appellant in good time for it to be considered when making their appeal.

For the reasons given above and having had regard to all other matters raised, I recommend that the appeal should be dismissed.

I have considered all the submitted evidence and my representative’s report and on that basis the appeal is dismissed.