Appeal 6003275

The appeal is allowed and planning permission is granted for front porch and side utility room extension, at [site address] , [site address] [postcode] , in accordance with the terms of the application, Ref 25/01434/FUL, and the plans DR01, DR03, DR04, DR05 and DR06 submitted with it.

The application was made on a retrospective basis, and I saw a front porch and side extension in situ at my visit. However, for the avoidance of doubt, I have considered the appeal on the basis of the plans and other particulars before me.

The appeal is made against the failure of the Council to determine an application for planning permission within the statutory time period. However, the dispute in this case relates to a procedural matter rather than the planning merits.

In short, the Council’s position is that the applicant (as the appellant then was) signed the incorrect notice on the application form relating to land ownership. The now-appellant signed [name] to assert sole ownership over the land in question, whereas the Council contends that [name] should have been signed, as the development extended onto land to the side of the property which is actually owned by the Council. A different signed certificate was not provided and the Council subsequently declined to determine the application on the basis that it could not responsibly do so when the land ownership remained unresolved and in dispute. The Council has not otherwise argued that the development is unacceptable on its planning merits.

In light of this, the main issue is whether the planning application was correctly made, with particular regard to the service of the requisite land ownership notice, and whether the appeal is capable of being lawfully determined.

Section 65 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (the Act) states that the Secretary of State may make a development order which requires notice to be given of any application for planning permission and that a certificate must be issued to confirm that requisite notice has been served on a relevant landowner. The relevant order is the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) Order 2015 (the DMPO). Article 13 of the DMPO sets out the requirements with respect to the form and contents of the notice.

The evidence before me includes various plans showing the extent of land ownership of both the appellant and the Council. One location plan submitted with the application (dated 30 July 2025) shows the site boundary to the eastern side of the dwelling at [site address] following a triangular alignment that takes in the grass verge up to the back edge of the pavement.

However, a Land Registry Title Plan (No CB154824) for [site address] shows the eastern boundary line of the property following a straight line close to and parallel with the dwelling, with the triangular grass verge falling outside of the red line. I glean from this that the extent of land to the side of the dwelling within the red line amounts to the width of a passageway for rear access. Indeed, among the appellant’s own plans, Drawings DR05 (Section and Block Plan) and DR06 (Location Plan), both accord with the site boundary as depicted on the title plan.

The Council has also provided Title Plan HN5114 which shows numerous parcels of highway verge within the same ownership. Notably, this includes the triangular area of grass verge next to [site address] and, viewed side by side, the two title plans tally. I do not have the accompanying title to confirm it is the Council who owns these parcels, but given the overall evidence before me, and the nature of these parcels as small areas of open land alongside the highway and beyond any individual dwelling, it is reasonable to conclude that this is Council land. The appellant has not provided any evidence to the contrary.

I saw at my site visit that the side extension to [site address] appears to project beyond the width of the side passageway into the grass verge identified on the title plan as Council land. On the evidence before me, the then-applicant should have signed [name] of the application form as the proposal related, at least in part, to land not within his control.

Section 65(5) of the Act states that if any requirements of the section in respect of notification regarding a planning application have not been satisfied the local planning authority shall not entertain the application. However, under Section 79(1) of the Act, the Secretary of State has discretion to: (a) allow or dismiss the appeal (b) reverse or vary any part of the decision of the LPA (whether the appeal relates to part of it or not) and may deal with the application as if it had been made to him in the first instance. Furthermore, Section 79(6) gives discretion to decline to determine an appeal or proceed with its determination if it emerges during the appeal process that planning permission could not have been granted by the local planning authority.

The courts have further held that there is discretion to allow an appeal to proceed notwithstanding a failure to comply with any statutory requirements, although this discretion should only be exercised following full regard to all the circumstances, such as the nature of the failure, the remedy, the lapse of time, the effect on other parties and the public and whether prejudice has been caused to any party.

In this case, the only party potentially affected by the failure of the appellant to sign [name] is the Council itself, which is also the local planning authority to whom the application was made. Therefore, notwithstanding the failure to sign the correct certificate, the Council as the other landowner was clearly aware of the application and had the opportunity to address matters.

In summary, the evidence indicates that the applicant signed the incorrect certificate on the application form; however, in the circumstances, the affected landowner, the Council, was fully aware of the application. I am satisfied that planning officers had opportunity to consult with other Council departments as necessary to understand the implications of the proposal, and it is my judgment that the Council was not prejudiced by the failure to sign the correct certificate. Consequently, pursuant to Section 79(6) of the Act, I find that the appeal can proceed to determination.

The Council has not otherwise raised any concern with the planning merits of the development, finding the additions acceptable in terms of their effect on character and appearance, neighbours’ living conditions, flood risk and highway safety. I saw the additions to be modest in scale, subservient to the main dwelling and appropriate in materials. They add to an established pattern of side extensions in the immediate area. Moreover, the development retains a significant extent of the grass verge and does not appear to encroach into it in an incongruous fashion. The extensions are to the front and side, facing the public realm and away from neighbouring properties, which are not affected. Nor do the additions result in a significant change to site drainage or reduce the availability of off-street parking or otherwise affect highway safety.

Overall, I conclude that the development accords with Policies LP11, LP12, LP14 and LP32 of Huntingdonshire's Local Plan to 2036 (May 2019), which together promote good design, require high standards of amenity, protect open space, prevent increased flood risk and ensure public safety.

The question of land ownership is ultimately separate to the planning process, and any outstanding matters between the appellant and the Council in this respect are for the parties to address between themselves.

As the appeal is made retrospectively, no conditions are necessary.

For the reasons set out above, the development accords with the development plan, taken as a whole, and there are no material considerations of sufficient weight to indicate that permission should nevertheless be withheld.

Therefore, the appeal is allowed.