Appeal 6003487

The appeal is dismissed and planning permission is refused.

An application for costs was made by [name] against Somerset Council. This application is the subject of a separate Decision.

I have taken the address of the site from the appeal form, which differs from that used in the application form. I am satisfied that no party would be prejudiced as a result.

The appeal results from the failure of the Council to determine the application within the prescribed period, and so there is no formal decision notice. Nevertheless, the Council’s Statement of Case sets out the reasons why planning permission would have been refused had it been empowered to do so.

The appeal application originally sought to vary condition 3, to include people employed in a rural business rather than just in agriculture. However, the description of the 1990 permission referred to the approved dwelling as being for an agricultural worker. The Council considered that the application would conflict with case law1, by effectively seeking to vary the approved description.

Consequently, during the course of the appeal application, a Non-Material Amendment2 was sought and approved. This varied the description of development of the 1990 permission to ‘erection of new dwelling and alterations to existing access’, thus excluding reference to an agricultural worker. The appellant then amended the proposal subject to the appeal application, to be for the complete removal of condition 3, allowing unrestricted occupation. The main issue is therefore whether the continued imposition of condition 3 as originally worded would be reasonable and necessary.

Condition 3 permits the occupation of the dwelling by someone employed or last employed in agriculture, or their widow or widower. However, the wider site includes a horse-related business, the [site address] [name]. This involves the care, training and management of competition horses and ponies, and the support of grassroots equestrian competing at an international level. A Certificate of Lawfulness was granted in March 2024 to confirm that land around the dwelling can be used for equestrian purposes, rather than for agriculture. That said, this does not include the dwelling itself.

With some evidence, the appellant maintains that occupation of the dwelling has historically not complied with the terms of the condition, and that this has become lawful. The Council is not convinced that lawfulness has been proved. In any case, the proposal before me is for planning permission rather than for a Certificate of Lawfulness. As such, whether continuous occupation of the dwelling in breach of the condition has occurred, and is now lawful, is not a matter for me. Instead, I must determine the appeal solely on its planning merits. It follows that the Planning Practice Guidance advice3 about evidence in Certificate of Lawfulness applications is not relevant here.

Policy D10 of the Sedgemoor Local Plan (SLP), adopted 20 February 2019, provides the relevant development plan policy. It supports new dwellings for rural workers in certain circumstances, rather than being limited to those employed in agriculture. It thus accords with the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework). Nevertheless, policy D10 resists the removal of occupancy conditions already in existence, unless it has been demonstrated that there is no existing or foreseeable need on the unit or in the local area. It also requires an independent market assessment following an unsuccessful attempt to market the property at a realistic price.

No detail of any marketing exercise is before me. Accordingly, I have little substantive evidence of a lack of need for an agricultural dwelling in the local area, even if it is not required on the unit itself. Nor do I have clear information to show that the dwelling would be unaffordable to someone who would comply with the condition, despite an approved extension to it. The appeal at Wellington4 is a case 1 Armstrong v Secretary of State for Levelling-Up, Housing and Communities and Another [2023] EWHC 176 (Admin) 2 LPA reference 51/25/00022 3 Paragraph: 006 [name]: 17c-006-20140306 4 APP/W3330/W/23/3326347 where marketing was carried out, albeit in respect of a different Development Plan, and so this does not support the appellant’s position.

The Framework encourages the development and diversification of agricultural and other land-based rural businesses. I understand that the equestrian business requires early and late attendance on site, welfare supervision, security, and the management of clients and liveries. Even so, I have little substantive evidence to suggest that this amounts to a clearly established functional and financial justification for the dwelling, as required by policy D10. Consequently, I cannot be satisfied that removal of the condition, or its replacement with one permitting occupation by a rural worker, would be justified on this basis.

Retention of the occupancy condition may well place risks on the existing business. If there is a breach of planning control, the threat to the continued occupation of the dwelling by the appellant and her family would undoubtedly cause distress. Marketing itself could adversely affect the operation of the business, although the terms of the condition would not necessarily require a potential occupier to re-introduce agricultural use at the site. In any case, these are risks that will have been apparent for many years, and flow from any breach. They do not provide a strong justification to allow the removal or variation of the

The proposal would not introduce a new dwelling or intensify the existing development. However, policy D10 and the Framework seek to limit development in the countryside, and to avoid new isolated homes. This is in the interests of maintaining the intrinsic character and beauty of the countryside. Relaxation of the concession given for occupational dwellings, without good reason, would undermine these aims.

For the reasons given above, I conclude that the continued imposition of condition 3 as originally worded is reasonable and necessary. Its variation or removal would therefore conflict with SLP policy D10 and the Framework.

For the reasons given, I have found conflict with the Development Plan as a whole. The material considerations in this case do not indicate a decision other than in accordance with the Development Plan. This leads me to conclude that the appeal should be dismissed.