Appeal 6003518

The appeal is dismissed.

The appeal follows the failure by the Council to determine the planning application within the prescribed time period. As the appeal is against non-determination, the Council issued no formal decision. Within the initial written submissions, the Council confirmed two putative reasons as to why planning permission would have been refused. The reasons related to the proposal being inappropriate development in the Green Belt, with harm to its openness, and the adequacy of the information submitted in relation to the effect of the proposal on [name] (“EPS”).

The signed declaration on the outline planning permission form clearly states “I/We hereby apply for Outline planning permission: All matters reserved as described in the questions answered, details provided, and the accompanying plans/drawings and additional information.” The way the application was made must therefore be treated as decisive as there is no evidence any subsequent adjustment was agreed between the parties.

Neither the appellant or the Council have sought to clarify which matters pertaining to access, appearance, landscaping, layout and scale were reserved for subsequent approval. As such, in cases where all matters are reserved, then any plans are treated as illustrative only.

As the description of development refers to a self-build dwelling, clarification was sought as to whether the proposal would be exempt from the provisions of the Environment Act 2021 relating to [name] (“BNG”). In particular, whether the development could be appropriately secured as self-build by condition and whether this would meet the relevant legal and policy tests within the National Planning Policy Framework (“the Framework”).

The appellant subsequently provided a [name] (“UU”). The Appeals Procedural Guide requires appellants to ensure that an executed and certified copy of any planning obligation is submitted at the time of making the appeal. I have exceptionally accepted the UU for consideration as the Council had the opportunity to comment on it. I return to this matter later in my decision.

The main issues are: • whether the proposal would be inappropriate development in the Green Belt having regard to the Framework; • the effect of the development on the openness of the Green Belt; • whether the proposal would have a harmful effect on EPS; and • whether any harm by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, would be clearly outweighed by other considerations, so as to amount to the very special circumstances required to justify the proposal.

Smithy Green is a small rural settlement characterised by a dispersed pattern of development. The appeal site lies along a narrow country lane leading from [address] and is framed by extensive arable fields to the north and east. Built form is more evident to the south and west, where properties are generally well screened by trees and established garden planting.

The proposal comprises a two-storey dwelling with a garage and associated residential curtilage. It is intended to be delivered as a bespoke self-build project. The appellant indicates that the dwelling would be designed having regard to the character of surrounding development and would incorporate modern sustainability measures, including energy-efficient construction and low-carbon technologies.

The site lies within the Green Belt where, under the Framework, development is inappropriate unless it falls within the exceptions set out in paragraph 154. The site comprises open land. [name] barns may previously have been present, land last occupied by agricultural or forestry buildings and land where any permanent structures have merged into the landscape is excluded from the definition of previously developed land. As such, the site does not fall within any of the paragraph 154 exceptions. Nor does the proposal meet the criteria of Policy PG3 of the Cheshire East Local Plan Strategy (2010–2030), adopted July 2017 (“the CELPS”), which relates to development within the Green Belt.

The Framework at paragraph 155 introduced the concept of grey belt land when it was revised in 2024. For the purposes of decision-making, the grey belt is defined as land in the Green Belt comprising previously developed land and/or any other land that, in either case, does not strongly contribute to any of Purposes (a), (b), or (d) in Framework paragraph 143. Policy PG3 of the CELPS does not include this provision. As a result, it is not fully consistent with the Framework. I have therefore afforded greater weight to the Framework in this regard.

The Framework indicates that, subject to other considerations, housing development should not be regarded as inappropriate where it would utilise grey belt land, provided specific criteria are met. In this case, and consistent with the Council’s position, the site can be considered grey belt land as it passes the gateway tests. In particular, the land does not strongly contribute to Green Belt purposes (a) checking the unrestricted sprawl of large built-up areas, (b) preventing neighbouring towns from merging into one another, or (d) preserving the setting and special character of historic towns, as set out in paragraph 143 of the Framework. Whether the proposal constitutes inappropriate development therefore depends on an assessment against the subsequent tests set out in Framework paragraph 155 (a) to (c).

The proposal would result in a modest outward extension of built form; however, its effect on Green Belt purpose 143(c), which seeks to safeguard the countryside from encroachment, would be limited. Given the scale of development, it would not materially undermine the objective of encouraging urban regeneration, as set out in purpose 143(e). Taking the Green Belt purposes together, the proposal would not fundamentally undermine their overall function. Accordingly, criterion (a) of Framework paragraph 155 is satisfied.

Framework paragraph 155(b) requires there to be a demonstrable unmet housing need. This is established where a five-year supply of deliverable housing land cannot be demonstrated. The Council’s most recent [name], published in April 2025 (base date 31 March 2024), identifies a deliverable five-year housing land supply of 10,011 dwellings. When assessed against a five-year local housing need of 13,015 dwellings (2,603 dwellings per annum, including a 5% buffer), this equates to a 3.8-year supply. While the 2023 [name] result shows strong historic performance, with a delivery score of 262%, this does not alter the current position that a five-year housing land supply cannot be demonstrated. Accordingly, there is a clear unmet housing need, and the proposal complies with Framework paragraph 155(b).

To meet the grey belt exception set out in paragraph 155(c) of the Framework, the proposal must be located in a sustainable location, with particular regard to paragraphs 110 and 115. These set out key requirements in relation to transport and accessibility. Paragraph 110 seeks to ensure that development reduces the need to travel and provides a genuine choice of transport modes, while paragraph 115 requires that safe and suitable access is achieved for all users.

A limited range of services are nearby, including a primary school, place of worship and public house. However, these are not safely or reasonably accessible on foot. The B5081 distributor road is narrow, unpaved in parts, unlit and subject to a 40mph speed limit, presenting clear and unacceptable risks to pedestrian safety. The appellant identifies a shorter route to the primary school, this involves crossing fields or informal land, which is inherently unsuitable for regular use as it would be isolated, unlit and potentially of uneven terrain. Such routes would not provide a safe, direct or convenient means of access for day-to-day journeys, particularly in all-weather conditions.

Consequently, these constraints would act as a significant deterrent to walking and render such routes impractical for everyday trips, including access to the school. For the same reasons, other day‐to‐day services, as well as social and community facilities in nearby settlements, would similarly be inaccessible on foot.

The availability of school bus services is noted and may assist in meeting the travel needs of school-age children, particularly for secondary education. However, this relates only to a specific group of users and a limited range of journeys. It is not clear whether such provision would extend to the wider day-to-day travel needs of other occupants. As such, whilst a bus stop exists within a realistic everyday walking distance from the site, the evidence does not detail the specific commercial bus route numbers, destinations, or service frequency. I cannot be certain whether this is operational, other than for school transport.

The appellant places considerable reliance on cycling as a primary sustainable travel mode, providing detailed routing evidence to [name], Knutsford, and local services alongside health-based justifications for an active lifestyle. However, while journeys to destinations within a 3–5km range are achievable for confident cyclists, distance alone does not equate to locational accessibility. Day-to-day trips would require physical exertion, confidence, and mobility that cannot be universally assumed for all users, particularly over a lifetime of changing personal demographics.

This limitation is compounded by the hazards of the local infrastructure. The surrounding network, including the [address] bridleway and various non-road options highlighted by the appellant, primarily consists of narrow, fast-moving rural roads or unmade and unlit tracks. Because the network completely lacks dedicated, segregated cycling infrastructure, these conditions substantially compromise personal safety and reduce the year-round attractiveness of cycling during winter months or inclement weather.

Beyond cycling, the appellant points to homeworking, digital service access, low-emission vehicles, and the proximity of employment at [name]. However, these choices represent personal travel behaviours and a holistic lifestyle that cannot be guaranteed for future occupants, nor do they replace the physical requirement to access a wider range of daily services. Because planning permissions run with the land, the Framework requires the site itself to physically provide or realistically access services and facilities by genuine, reliable non-car modes.

Whilst safe vehicular access could be achieved, and the Framework recognises that opportunities for sustainable transport will vary between urban and rural areas, the site is located within a dispersed rural context where the limited nearby facilities are not safely or reliably accessible by non-car modes. These constraints are further compounded by the lack of any clearly evidenced or reliable commercial bus provision to connect occupiers to services and facilities. As a result, the site fails to provide a genuine choice of transport modes and would not reduce the need to travel; notwithstanding the rural nature future occupiers would therefore be highly reliant on the private car, in direct conflict with the transport objectives of the Framework.

Consequently, because the proposal fails to satisfy the transport requirements of paragraphs 110 and 115, it cannot meet the criteria of paragraph 155(c) of the Framework. As a result, the development does not benefit from the grey belt exception. I therefore conclude that the proposal constitutes inappropriate development in the Green Belt. Such development is, by definition, harmful and should not be approved except in very special circumstances. The proposal therefore conflicts with policy PG3 of the CELPS, which strictly prohibits inappropriate development where no exception applies except in very special circumstances (“VSC”). It would also conflict with paragraphs 154 and 155 of the Framework, as it does not fall within any of the exceptions.

Paragraph 142 of the Framework establishes that the fundamental aim of Green Belt policy is to prevent urban sprawl by keeping land permanently open. The essential characteristics of Green Belts are their openness and their permanence. It is well-established in law that openness has both a spatial and a visual dimension, both of which must be evaluated when assessing the impact of a proposal.

From a spatial perspective, although the plans are indicative, the introduction of a substantial two-storey, five-bedroom dwelling and a detached garage into a section of land currently free from built structures represents an absolute, intrinsic loss of openness. Spatially, the proposal would insert substantial built volume, domestic massing, and associated hardstanding where none currently exist, permanently diminishing the physical openness of this immediate section of the Green Belt.

Visually, even though the proposed dwelling would be set back from the road with partial screening from existing landscape features, the permanent presence of a domestic structure and its associated residential paraphernalia would result in a distinct visual encroachment into the open countryside. While the appellant proposes to lower the roadside hedge, altering its height would merely increase the visual permeability and exposure of the site rather than offset the physical introduction of built form.

Consequently, because of its combined spatial and visual impacts, the proposal fails to preserve the openness of the Green Belt. While the extent of this loss may be localised, it represents a clear and direct conflict with the essential characteristics and core purposes of the designation as set out in paragraphs 142 and 143 of the Framework.

ODPM1 Circular 06/2005 makes clear that the presence, or likely presence, of protected species and the extent to which they may be affected should normally be established before planning permission is granted. This reflects a precautionary approach, ensuring that planning decisions are taken on a fully informed basis. While the appellant contends that the Council has not identified definitive evidence of such species on-site, the burden of proof rests with the appellant to demonstrate that the proposal would not result in harm, rather than upon the decision-maker to establish their presence.

The appellant relies on an ecological report dating from 2014. Ecological conditions naturally change over time, particularly where habitats have the potential to support [name], such as [name] (“GCN”). The passage of more than a decade significantly undermines the reliability of the submitted survey. There is no up-to-date evidence before me to demonstrate that site conditions remain unchanged or that protected species are 1 [name] Minister 16 August 2005 unlikely to be present. In this regard, Natural England’s standing advice 2 indicates that ecological surveys more than a few years old are unlikely to remain valid without being updated.

Whilst surveys need only be undertaken where there is a reasonable likelihood of protected species being present, I am satisfied that this threshold is met in this instance. Natural England’s advice is a material consideration, which identifies ponds, hedgerows, woodland, and scrub as features indicating a high potential for protected species. The appeal site and its immediate surroundings comprise exactly these features, exhibiting a range of semi-natural habitats, including a pond that contained water at the time of my site visit. Consequently, I cannot be certain that the site does not possess physical potential to support EPS such as GCN and bats.

I have considered the appellant’s argument that Circular 06/2005 justifies deferring the required surveys to a planning condition. However, the Circular explicitly states that such an approach is only appropriate in exceptional circumstances, and not where a reasonable likelihood exists that protected species are present and could be affected. Because the physical characteristics of the site establish that likelihood, the necessary baseline surveys cannot be deferred. While certain adjacent matters, such as protection for nesting birds or potential biodiversity enhancements, may be capable of being controlled via condition, this does not overcome the fundamental uncertainty regarding the presence or absence of EPS.

I cannot conclude that the development would not harm EPS in the absence of up-to-date, definitive survey information. The proposal is therefore contrary to Policy SE3 of the CELPS. It also conflicts with national policy, specifically paragraphs 192 and 193 of the Framework, which seek to conserve and enhance biodiversity and require that harm to protected species be avoided or adequately mitigated. In the absence of robust, current evidence, it has not been demonstrated that these statutory and policy requirements can be met.

Inappropriate development is, by definition, harmful to the Green Belt and should not be approved except in VSC. Paragraph 153 of the Framework explains that substantial weight must be given to any harm to the Green Belt, and that VSC will not exist unless the potential harm by reason of inappropriateness, and any other harm, is clearly outweighed by other considerations.

The proposed development constitutes inappropriate development in the Green Belt and would result in an intrinsic loss of openness. In addition to this primary Green Belt harm, the proposal would cause moderate other harm by virtue of its unsustainable location, which would leave future occupiers entirely reliant on the private car to access day-to-day services and facilities. Furthermore, it has not been demonstrated that the development would not have an adverse effect on EPS creating a fundamental uncertainty that carries substantial weight against the proposal.

In favour of the proposal, as the Council cannot currently demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable housing land, the development would provide a single self-build opportunity and make a limited contribution toward addressing this housing 2 Protected species and development: advice for local planning authorities shortfall and self-build plots. The proposal would also generate minor localised socio-economic benefits during the construction phase and subsequently through future occupiers’ spending.

The appellant highlights a range of sustainability measures, including the use of reclaimed materials, rainwater harvesting, renewable energy technologies, and potential ecological enhancements. Whilst positive in principle, these measures are described only in broad terms, are not secured through any specific mechanism, and largely reflect standard practice or compliance with existing Building Regulations.

Regard has also been given to the appellant’s personal circumstances and stated lifestyle preferences. However, planning permissions run with the land; these specific behavioural benefits cannot be guaranteed to apply to future occupiers. Taking all of these supporting factors together and given the small scale of the single-dwelling development, the combined benefits of the proposal attract only moderate weight.

There is no substantive evidence before me to indicate that the development would give rise to unacceptable impacts in respect of highway safety, drainage, or residential amenity, nor has the Council raised objections on these grounds. However, the absence of harm is a neutral factor that weighs neither for nor against the proposal.

To conclude, the other considerations advanced by the appellant, whether considered individually or in combination, are insufficient to clearly outweigh the substantial harm to the Green Belt and the other identified environmental harm. Consequently, the VSC necessary to justify inappropriate development in the Green Belt do not exist.

The Council’s inability to demonstrate a five-year supply of deliverable housing land engages paragraph 11(d) of the Framework. However, Footnote 7 explicitly provides that the presumption in favour of sustainable development does not apply where Framework policies protecting areas or assets of particular importance, such as designated Green Belt, indicate that development should be restricted. Having concluded that the proposal constitutes inappropriate development that fails to preserve openness, a strong reason for refusal exists. Consequently, the application of paragraph 11(d) is disengaged.

The submitted UU lacks a binding definition of self-build, contains no restrictions on initial occupation or onward sale, and exhibits critical spatial discrepancies by referencing conflicting plans ("Plan A" and "Plan B") that extend well beyond the application's red-line boundary. Similarly, the suggested planning conditions omit crucial compliance, eligibility verification, and monitoring milestones3, meaning they would be difficult to enforce and would fail the strict planning tests set out in paragraph 56 of the Framework. Consequently, neither the UU nor the conditions can be relied upon in their current form to secure a genuine self-build dwelling. However, as I am dismissing the appeal on other substantive grounds, it is unnecessary for me to pursue these deficiencies further. 3 Set out in Right to [name] and Self-Build Planning Guidance PG3.8: Securing custom and self-build using obligations and conditions November 2024 Version 2

Whilst the development would give rise to certain benefits, including a single self-build plot making a small contribution to housing supply and associated localised socio-economic benefits, these collectively attract no more than modest weight. Set against this, the proposal is in direct conflict with the development plan policies which are most important for determining the application. This is because it constitutes inappropriate development in the Green Belt, causing harm which, by virtue of paragraph 153 of the Framework, carries substantial weight. Alongside this is the unresolved uncertainty regarding EPS. The proposal is also in conflict with the Framework in these respects, as well as failing to align with national objectives regarding the location of development and sustainable transport.

Taking all material considerations into account, I conclude that the proposal conflicts with the development plan taken as a whole, and there are no considerations of sufficient weight, including the policies of the Framework, to indicate that the appeal should be determined otherwise than in accordance with it. For the reasons given above, the appeal is dismissed