Appeal 6003870

The appeal is allowed and prior approval is deemed to be granted under the provisions of Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended) for conversion of agricultural building to form 2 semi-detached dwellings at [site address] , [site address] , Cropredy, Oxfordshire [postcode] , in accordance with the details provided in application ref 25/01304/Q56.

On 21 May 2024, [name] 2024 No. 579 came into force amending Article 3(1), Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015, as amended (the GPDO). Under the transitional arrangements, set out under Article 10, the developer may make a prior approval application in relation to the previously permitted development under Class Q until the end of 20 May 2025. The application confirms that the intention is to use the permitted development right as it stood prior to 21 May 2024. I have therefore dealt with the appeal on this basis.

Under Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q of the GPDO, planning permission is granted for (a) change of use of a building and any land within its curtilage from a use as an agricultural building to a use falling within use class C3 (dwellinghouses) together with (b) building operations reasonably necessary to convert the building, subject to limitations and conditions. In this regard, paragraph Q.2. of the GPDO requires that the developer must apply to the local planning authority for a determination as to whether prior approval will be required for certain matters. The decision must be made by the Council within a period of 56 days. If that notification has not occurred in time, then prior approval is deemed to be granted.

The Council suggest that the proposed development does not constitute development permitted under Class Q of the GPDO, and my attention has been drawn to Keenan v Woking Borough Council, and Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government [2017] [name] 438 (the Keenan judgment). The principle upheld in the Keenan judgment is that development cannot become permitted development by default if the Council does not determine a prior approval application within the statutory period.

There is no dispute that the Council did not notify the appellant of their decision on the prior approval application within the 56-day period. Furthermore, the parties made no agreement in writing that the 56-day period could be extended. Therefore, the expiry of the statutory period means that prior approval was deemed to be granted.

In these circumstances, the appeal should be allowed on the basis that prior approval is deemed to be granted by the GPDO. However, the development subsequently undertaken is only lawful if it is carried out in accordance with the submitted plans and it is in fact permitted development that satisfies the limitations and conditions of Class Q. Indeed, it is for the appellant to satisfy themself that the development conforms to these limitations. If it does not conform to these provisions, the GPDO does not grant it planning permission and the proposed development will be at risk of enforcement action by the Council. This would be a matter for the Council and the appellant to resolve.

I have considered the appeal against the relevant requirements on its own merits. As such, although I have considered each of the appeal decisions referred to by the main parties, they do not alter my decision.

For the reasons given above, the appeal should be allowed, and prior approval is deemed to be granted.