Appeal 6005348

The appeal is dismissed.

Planning Practice Guidance (PPG) advises that the permission in principle consent is an alternative way of obtaining planning permission for housing-led development. This is a two-stage process and planning permission is only created once both stages have been completed. The first stage, Permission in Principle (PiP), establishes whether a site is suitable in-principle, and the second stage, [name] (TDC), is when the detailed development proposals are assessed.

[name] the scope of considerations are limited to location, land use and the amount of development permitted1. All other matters are considered as part of the subsequent TDC application if the PiP is granted.

The [site address] Site of Importance for Nature Conservation (SINC) referred to in the reason for refusal has also been referred to as a Local Wildlife Site and a Site of Nature Conservation Interest (SNCI) within the submitted evidence. For clarity it will be referred to as the SINC in this decision.

The main issue is the effect of the proposed development on the biodiversity of the SINC, with specific regard to location, the proposed land use, and the amount of development.

The appeal site is rectangular section of a larger field, which is being used for horse grazing. It has a gated access onto [site address] Lane, a hedged boundary on 2 sides, as apart from the adjacent dwelling is surrounded by fields. It is located within the SINC which is a designated site of value for local biodiversity due to it being an important neutral grassland habitat. 1 set out within PPG: Permission in principle Paragraph: 012 [name]: 58-[phone] Revision date: 15 06 2018

South Gloucestershire Local Plan: Policies, Sites and Places Plan (LP) Policy PSP19, amongst other things, seek where possible to prevent development that would result in significant harm to sites of value for local biodiversity.

The appellant’s Preliminary Ecology Assessment Report and [name] (BS), confirms the existing use of the appeal site, horse grazing, has turned the appeal site into modified grassland. Nevertheless, there is potential that modified grassland could become a more species rich and diverse grassland should the current grazing activities stop. This is recognised within the appellant’s BS, in its assertions that the wider field the appeal site is part of could be managed to create a more species-rich and diverse grassland.

Therefore, as the proposal would include at least one building as well as associated hardstanding and domestic landscaping, it would permanently prevent part of the appeal site from ever being able to revert back to a more compatible grassland type. This permanent removal of land, even degraded habitat, from the SINC would by definition cause significant harm to it.

However, LP Policy PSP19 goes on to state that where development resulting in significant harm cannot be avoided by locating on an alternative site with less harmful impacts, adequately mitigated or, as a last resort compensated for, it will be refused.

The appellant has not undertaken any alternative site research. They state they are seeking to construct a self-build home on land they own and that there are no sufficient serviced plots coming through the development plan. Nevertheless, there is no demonstrable evidence to support this position in terms of serviced plots. Nor has it been shown that within the land owned by the appellant there is no alternative site which would have a less harmful impact on the SINC. Without being able to evidence this the proposal therefore fails to comply with LP Policy PSP19.

It is recognised the appellant has proposed some mitigation but, as supporting LP paragraphs 6.32 and 6.33 confirm, Policy PSP19 should be applied sequentially. As such it would first need to be shown that no alternative sites were suitable before mitigation can be considered.

The appellant considers the appeal site to not have the ecological characteristics to meet SINC designation and has also highlighted planning permission P20/24044/O as an example of the Council’s inconsistency in dealing with SINC land. However, it is not for this decision to determine whether the appeal site should continue to be within the SINC, and I am limited to consider the planning merits of the scheme before me.

Accordingly, it can only be concluded that the proposed residential land use in this location could have a significantly harmful effect on the biodiversity of the [site address] SINC and would fail to comply with LP Policy PSP19.

The appellant has proposed that the dwelling would be self-build and in paragraph 6.35 of their statement of case have identified a lack of self-build provision in [name]. To be considered self-build it is necessary for the proposal to be clear that the initial owner of the proposed home will have primary input into its final design and layout2. As a single dwelling is proposed, on a balance of probabilities, it is conceivable that the design and layout details within a future TDC could include the primary input of the initial owner of that dwelling and be secured at that stage.

As a self-build dwelling the proposal would also be exempt from the Biodiversity Net Gain Regulations.

The Council cannot demonstrate a 5-year housing land supply, with the appellant identifying the current housing land supply as 4.41 years. It is therefore necessary for Paragraph 11 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) to be applied.

The proposal could provide a singular self-build dwelling reasonably quickly in a location confirmed by the Council to be reasonably accessible. Taking account of the lack of self-build provision as well as the contribution the proposal would have to the Council’s five-year housing land supply, these benefits would attract moderate weight.

However significant harm has been identified to the SINC, and housing provision should not come at the loss of land within a locally designated site of biodiversity value, a position supported by the Framework which also seeks to safeguard and improve the environment.

Therefore, in this instance it is found that the adverse impact of the proposal would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, and the appeal is dismissed.