Appeal 6005366

The appeal is dismissed.

Since the Council determined the planning application, the South Worcestershire Development Plan Review, March 2026 (the DP) has been adopted. This replaces the South Worcestershire Development Plan 2016. Accordingly, I have determined the appeal on the basis of the current development plan. The appellant was given opportunity to comment on the implications of this as part of the appeal process and I have taken into account any comments made in my reasoning.

Reason for refusal 2 relates to the absence of a legal agreement to secure the proposed dwelling as a self and custom build dwelling. The appellant has submitted, as part of this appeal, a completed unilateral undertaking which would secure this. Consequently, the Council has confirmed that this reason for refusal is withdrawn. As such, I do not need to consider this matter further.

Having regard to the above, the main issue is whether the proposal would be a suitable form of development having regard to development plan policy in respect of replacement buildings.

The appeal site includes an existing pair of semi-detached two storey dwellings, known as 1 [address] and 2 [address]. The proposal is for the partial demolition of No. 2 and the erection of a detached dwelling on grassland to the west of the existing dwellings. The remaining parts of No.2 would be incorporated into an extended and altered No.1.

The appeal site is within open countryside, where DP Policy SWDPR 03 states that development will be strictly controlled subject to other policies in the Plan. In this regard, DP Policy SWDPR 23 concerns the replacement of dwellings in the open countryside.

Policy SWPDR 23 permits the replacement of an existing dwelling in the open countryside with another single dwelling, where the proposal meets the criteria set by the policy. There is no dispute between the main parties that the proposal complies with criteria i., v., and vii. of. the policy. Based on the evidence before me, I see no reason to reach an alternative conclusion in this regard.

Criterion ii. of Policy SWDPR 23 requires it be demonstrated that accommodation needs cannot be met through the alteration, extension and / or refurbishment of the existing dwelling. The reasoned justification to the policy identifies that replacement dwellings can help maintain the level of existing housing stock, where properties are in poor repair, or not appropriate for current needs in terms of their design or size.

The appellant has submitted a [name] setting out their reasons for the proposal. This explains that the appellant, the occupier of No. 1, has a health condition which may necessitate adaptations to their home, including the provision of a ground floor bedroom and bathroom. It also states that the proposed detached dwelling would be occupied by their children, one of whom has identified health concerns and would benefit from family support in close proximity, and whose circumstances may limit their ability to afford independent accommodation.

As described by the appellant, and confirmed during my site visit, No.2 is in ‘poor repair’. Whilst Policy SWDPR 23 does not prescribe particular information requirements such as a structural report, it does require demonstration that accommodation needs cannot be met through alteration, extension and / or refurbishment. There is little substantive evidence before me that the existing property is not capable of refurbishment and modernisation. Moreover, the issues cited, such as a downstairs bathroom, small kitchen and lack of central heating are characteristic of older dwellings. Based on the evidence before me, including my site visit I am not satisfied that it would not be possible or viable for these issues to be overcome through refurbishment and reconfiguration of the internal layout.

Whilst the appellant considers extensions under permitted development to be undesirable, there is no evidence before me to demonstrate a lack of potential for the existing dwelling to be extended if additional floorspace were needed. Moreover, there is little evidence before me that extensions beyond permitted development rights have been considered.

Finally, in relation to criterion ii. there is nothing before me to demonstrate that the proposal to extend No.[address] to achieve the altered accommodation sought by the occupier to meet their needs.

I therefore find that, based on the evidence before me, the proposal does not satisfy the requirements of criterion ii of Policy SWDPR 23.

Criterion iii of Policy SWDPR 23 requires that the replacement dwelling is not disproportionately larger than the existing dwelling and will not exceed the existing gross internal floorspace by more than 30%. In this regard, I acknowledge the appellant’s point that the criterion refers to the replacement dwelling and not extensions. I have not been directed to any development plan policies regarding floorspace limits on extensions to existing dwellings.

The Council’s statement calculates that the proposed replacement dwelling would represent a 27% increase in floorspace compared to the existing floorspace of No.2. However, this calculation includes the existing detached garage. The reasoned justification to Policy SWDPR 23 states that detached garages and other detached outbuildings should be excluded from the floorspace calculations.

The appellant’s statement identifies the existing floorspace of No.2 to be 107.[address] metres, excluding the garage, compared to [address] metres for the proposed dwelling, representing an increase of approximately 47%. On the basis of the evidence before me, this would exceed the 30% limit set by criterion iii, and no justification has been provided to support such an exceedance.

Criterion iv of Policy SWDPR 23 requires that the proposed dwelling is positioned on the footprint of the existing dwelling, unless an alternative location is justified by public benefits, including, amongst other things, improved visual appearance, landscape character, biodiversity or other environmental gains.

The proposed dwelling would be located to the west of the existing dwelling and not on the existing footprint of No.2. This would allow part of No.2 to be subsumed as an extension to No.1. It is suggested that this would achieve a number of benefits.

In respect of visual amenity, the appellant contends that the proposed replacement dwelling would represent an improvement over the existing condition of the building. However, this relates to the design and condition of the replacement dwelling, rather than its siting. It is also suggested that the redistribution of land would allow for enhanced landscaping around the site. However, there is no substantive evidence that such landscaping could not be provided in connection with the existing dwelling.

It is suggested that the proposal would make sustainable use of existing resources by subsuming part of No.2 into No.1 to meet the accommodation needs of the appellant. However, this would not justify the alternative siting as this would be a private benefit. It is a well-founded principle that the planning system does not exist to protect private interests.

I acknowledge the appellant’s commitment to install solar panels on both dwellings, and that achieving higher Building Regulation standards may be more readily accomplished in a new build than through refurbishment. However, there is no substantive evidence that either benefit is contingent upon the proposed dwelling being sited other than on the existing footprint of No. 2.

Accordingly, I am not satisfied that the benefits advanced by the appellant are sufficient to justify the proposed dwelling not being sited on the footprint of the existing dwelling. As such, the proposal fails to satisfy the requirements of criterion iv.

Finally, criterion vi. of Policy SWDPR 23 requires the demolition of the dwelling which would be replaced. The appeal proposal would result in only the partial demolition of No.2. The appellant contends that the purpose of this criterion is not to increase the housing stock via this policy. Neither the policy nor the reasoned justification explains precisely the purpose of this criterion and the Council does not directly dispute the appellant’s interpretation. In this case, the proposal would not result in a net increase in the number of dwellings. In the absence of any substantive reasoning from the Council to the contrary, I find no conflict with criterion vi.

To be acceptable in the terms of Policy SWDPR 23, the proposal must comply with all of the criteria. Therefore, whilst I have found that the proposal would meet the requirements of some, the conflict with criteria ii, iii. and iv. means that the proposal conflicts with policy overall.

Taking all of the above into account, I therefore find that the proposal would not be a suitable form of development having regard to development plan policy in respect of replacement buildings. As such, it would be contrary to [name] 03 and SWDPR 23, as set out above.

The proposal would deliver a single self build dwelling. The Council’s evidence indicates that it has already met and exceeded its identified demand for self and custom build housing up to 30 October 2026. Consequently, this benefit attracts only limited weight. The scheme would also incorporate sustainability and biodiversity measures and provide some economic activity during construction. Nonetheless, the delivery of one dwelling would make only a modest contribution to housing supply, and the associated benefits would be similarly limited in scale. Taken together, these benefits attract only limited weight and do not outweigh the harm identified in respect of the main issue in this appeal.

I appreciate that the Council raises no objection in respect of the proposal’s design and appearance and its effect on the amenities of neighbouring occupiers. Nevertheless, this lack of harm weighs neutrally and does not amount to consideration in support of the appeal or alter my overall conclusions on the main issue.

My attention has been drawn to DP Policy SWDPR 17 which seeks all new dwellings, to meet, as a minimum, the requirements of Building Regulations Part M4(2) dwelling standard (Accessible and [name]). Whilst the appellant states that the downstairs bathroom proposed as part of the extension and alteration of No.1 would be wheelchair accessible, there is no substantive evidence before me that either of the dwellings would meet this requirement. As such, the proposal would not comply with DP Policy SWDPR 17 in this regard.

As part of determining this appeal proposal, I have had due regard to the Public Sector Equality Duty (PSED) contained in Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, which requires me to consider the need to eliminate unlawful discrimination, to advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people who share a protected characteristic and people who do not share it. Protected characteristics include a person’s disability. However, they are qualified rights, and interference may be justified where in the public interest. The concept of proportionality is key.

The proposal would allow the appellant’s children to reside next to their parents which would have the benefit of mutual support and care. It would also provide for a downstairs bedroom and bathroom in the appellant’s property. However, as I have set out above, I do not have sufficient evidence that the existing dwellings could not be adequately adapted and refurbished to meet these needs. Moreover, there is little before me to demonstrate that there is not alternative accommodation available to the appellant’s children.

Nonetheless, whilst I sympathise with the appellant’s position, having regard to my assessment above there is no over-riding reason to allow the proposed development to address their personal circumstances. As such, this does not amount to a material consideration of sufficient magnitude to outweigh the primacy of, and conflict found with, the development plan. Therefore, I conclude that the wider community or public interest is not outweighed by the PSED duties set out above.

For the reasons given above, I conclude that the proposal would conflict with the development plan as a whole and there are no material considerations that would outweigh that conflict. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed