Appeal 6005375

The appeal is dismissed.

An application for costs was submitted by Wychavon District Council against [name] and [name]. This application is the subject of a separate

I have taken the description of development from the decision notice, subject to amendment to remove wording which does not constitute a description of development, as it more accurately and concisely describes the development to which the appeal relates.

I have taken the site address from the appeal form, as on the evidence before me it more accurately describes the site.

Alongside my visit to the appeal site, as part of the appeal I also undertook a visit to a site identified as [address] or [name], [address], Crowle. I shall refer to this site as ‘Springridge’ and will return to this matter in my decision.

In their final submission the appellant made reference to a potential costs application were the appeal to be allowed. Planning Practice Guidance identifies that such a costs application must be made in writing no later than final comments stage. No such application is before me and I have therefore not considered this matter further.

Under Article 3(1) and Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q, of The Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (the ‘GPDO’), development is permitted for the change of use of a building and any land within its curtilage, from use as a building that is part of an established agricultural unit to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) together with building operations reasonably necessary to convert that building, subject to certain limitations and

Paragraph Q1 of the GPDO provides a list of exclusions as to when development would not be permitted by Class Q. The reasons for refusal identified that the areas of dispute at application stage were whether the appeal site was part of an established agricultural unit on 24th July 2023, and whether the building operations proposed would be reasonably necessary to convert the building to function as a use falling within Class C3.

Following the submission of additional information by the appellant, the Council withdrew its reason for refusal related to whether the site formed part of an established agricultural unit. The Council identified that instead it now considered the appeal site formed part of an established agricultural unit with Springridge, at which it considered development under agricultural permitted development rights had occurred, and drew my attention to the exclusion set out at Paragraph Q1(g) of the GPDO.

Following this, additional information was submitted whereby the appellant set out that they considered the site did not form part of an established agricultural unit with Springridge. Both parties have provided further comment on this and it would not prejudice either party to refer to this matter in my decision. Given the relationship between the matter of the established agricultural unit and the matter of the exclusion at Paragraph Q1(g) of the GPDO it is necessary to consider these two matters together in the main issues.

Given the above, the main issues therefore are: • whether the building operations proposed would be reasonably necessary to convert the building to a use falling within Class C3; • whether the appeal site forms part of an established agricultural unit and, if the site is found to be part of an established agricultural unit with Springridge, whether the proposal would constitute permitted development in respect of Paragraph Q1(g) of the GPDO; and • if the proposal is found to constitute permitted development, whether prior approval would be required and should be granted.

The existing building is steel framed with steel purlins and timber eaves beams. The roof consists of duo pitched bitumen fibre and steel corrugated panels. The barn is open on all sides. The floor is compacted earth and gravel with steel columns mounted onto concrete pads.

The proposal would result in the barn becoming 2 residential dwellings. The roof panels would be replaced. The steel frames and purlins would be retained. Timber frame insulated wall panels would be built between the steel columns and facing brickwork and cladding would be constructed external of the existing structure.

In considering whether the building operations proposed would be reasonably necessary to convert the building to dwellinghouses, my attention has been drawn to the judgement in Hibbitt v SSCLG & [name] [2016] EWHC 2853 (Admin). This identified that the building proposed for change of use under Class Q must be capable of conversion to residential use without operations amounting to a complete or substantial re-building of the pre-existing structure.

The appellant has submitted a [name] (2025) (the ‘[name]) which identifies that the steel columns are in good condition and together with the roof structure are suitable to support a lightweight roof system. The Structural Inspection also identifies that the primary structure of the barn is suitable to be retained, and that works would meet building regulations. The appellant has further stated that the steel frame would be structurally capable of, and used to support, the proposed walls, and that there is no need to reinforce the foundations. From what I saw on my site visit, I have no reason to disagree with these statements.

However, whilst the appellant considers the work to be comparatively minor, the proposal would enclose all four sides of the barn, and replace the roof covering. In effect, only the existing skeletal frame, roof purlins and associated supports and foundations would form part of the proposed dwellings.

Planning Practice Guidance identifies that it is not the intention of Class Q permitted development rights to allow rebuilding work which would go beyond what is reasonably necessary for the conversion of the building to residential use. Therefore, it is only where the existing building is already suitable for conversion to residential use that the building would be considered to have the permitted development right. In this regard, the works proposed are of such extent, and the starting point is so minimal, that the building operations proposed in this appeal would go substantially beyond a conversion and instead comprise a rebuilding of the existing structure.

Whilst my attention has been directed to a nearby appeal where an inspector concluded that works proposed to a building did not amount to a complete or substantial reconstruction, on the evidence before me this appeal related to a building whereby the proposal would replace the roof, and largely retain and internally insulate the external walls. As the degree of works proposed at that appeal are significantly less extensive and the contribution of the existing building significantly greater than the proposal before me, the referenced appeal does not lead me to an alternative conclusion on this issue. Equally, whilst I acknowledge that some proposed internal works may not constitute development this does not alter my conclusions with regards the proposal as a whole.

As a result of the above, due to the scale and extent of building operations proposed, I conclude that the building operations proposed would go beyond that reasonably necessary to convert the building. Given this, the proposal would also not be permitted development in accordance with Paragraph Q1(j) of the GPDO. Established agricultural unit and Paragraph Q1(g)

The barn at [site address] (‘[name]) is identified by the appellant as being used for purposes including the storage of feed and farm goods, as well as a place to feed and shelter sheep. The land associated with the appeal site is jointly owned by the appellants.

Signed statements from both appellants were included with the appeal, alongside a signed statement from a close family member. These statements identify sheep have been farmed at [name] by the close family member. This family member owns Springridge and combines the land at Springridge and [name] to rear sheep, which have been farmed every year for a significant period of time. The appellants have provided support with this sheep farming. The sheep are lambed at Springridge, and otherwise grazed at [name] for most of the year. These statements have not been substantively challenged, and I therefore have no reason to doubt that agricultural activities have been undertaken at the appeal site.

Other evidence from the appellant indicates that a barn at Springridge is used for lambing sheep for approximately one month of the year. This barn is otherwise used for storage of goods associated with the plant nursery at Springridge.

I have been provided with a copy of a decision by the Council identifying that prior approval was not required for the erection of a new agricultural building at Springridge, which has been recently constructed. I do not have the precise date of construction before me. However, given the date of the decision related to the prior approval application, this barn would preclude a change of use of a building or former agricultural building under Class Q of the GPDO on the same established agricultural unit for a significant period.

Springridge and [name] are some distance apart and under separate landownership, and may be under a separate holding registration. However, case law has established that agricultural land does not necessarily need to be contiguous or within the same ownership to constitute a single agricultural unit. As sheep are lambed at Springridge, and grazed at [name], and on the evidence before me have been for a significant period of time, there is a substantial degree of interdependence of activities between the two sites. Whilst the appellant suggests that sheep could be lambed at [site address] , there is no substantive evidence to suggest that they have been. Therefore, whilst the barn at Springridge may only be used for lambing for a month of the year, it is nevertheless integral to the agricultural activities at [site address] .

I acknowledge the appellant’s statement that horticultural activities are undertaken at Springridge. I have been provided with a recent copy of a business rate valuation for the plant nursery at Springridge which the appellant states constitutes a valuation consistent with a retail rather than agricultural use. However, a business rate valuation does not represent a change of use in planning terms, and I have not been directed to any planning application seeking to change the existing use at Springridge to a business or retail use. In any event, as the appellant identifies, horticulture is included within the definition of an agricultural use set out in the Act.

As such, evidence is not before me to suggest the lawful use of Springridge is anything other than agricultural. As already noted, the evidence from the appellant clearly indicates that a barn at Springridge is also integral to sheep farming activities at [name]. The signed statements set out that sheep have been farmed at both sites for a significant period that started well before the relevant dates set out in Paragraph Q1(a) of the GPDO. Given the nature and extent of interrelationship between the two sites I have described, on the evidence before me the appeal site and Springridge are together agricultural land occupied as a unit for the purposes of agriculture, and therefore form an established agricultural unit.

Whilst the appellant considers that an agricultural holding is commonly understood to be a single unit of land, and refers to various definitions including those set out in the Agricultural Holdings Act 1986 and the Agriculture Act 1947, these do not directly correlate to the definition of an established agricultural unit within the GPDO. As such, these definitions have not led me to an alternative conclusion on this issue.

There is no dispute between the parties that development under the relevant class of Schedule 2, Part 6 of the GPDO has been carried out at Springridge within the relevant period. Accordingly, given my conclusions with regards the established agricultural unit, development would not be permitted in accordance with Paragraph Q1(g) of the GPDO.

[name] have found above that the proposal would not constitute permitted development there is no requirement for me to consider the matters for which prior approval is required under [name].2(1) of the GPDO.

For the reasons given above the appeal should be dismissed.