Appeal 6005445

The appeal is dismissed

Within the context of an appeal under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 (the Act), it is not within my remit to formally determine the lawful use of land. If a person wishes to ascertain whether an existing use is or would be lawful, the correct approach is for an application to be made under section 191 or 192 of the Act for a certificate of lawful use.

Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q(a)(ii) of the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (as amended) (GPDO) permits development consisting of a change of use of a former agricultural building that was (but is no longer) part of an established agricultural unit and any land within that building's curtilage, to a use falling within Class C3 (dwellinghouses) of the Use Classes Order. This is subject to limitations and conditions as set out in paragraph Q.1 and Q.2.

The main parties agree that the appeal building is a former agricultural building that was (but is no longer) part of an established agricultural unit. Furthermore, there is no dispute with regard to the compliance of the scheme with paragraphs Q1 (c) to (p) and Q2(1) (a) – (g) of the GPDO. However, Class Q.1(b)(iii) states that development is not permitted if since ceasing to be part of an established agricultural unit, the site has been used for any non-agricultural purpose. In this case, the Council contends that since ceasing to be part of an established agricultural unit, the appeal site has been used for a non-agricultural purpose.

Therefore, the main issue is whether the proposal would be permitted development by virtue of Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q of the GPDO, having regard to whether since ceasing to be part of an established agricultural unit, the site has been used for a non-agricultural purpose.

There is no dispute between the main parties that the active use of the appeal building for agricultural purposes ceased in 2014, or that the building has been used for the parking of domestic vehicles and a horse box after 2014. Given the substantive evidence before me, including street view imagery, I see no reason to disagree.

Although it is put to me that vehicles parked in the building were on wheels and mobile, and that such temporary use of agricultural buildings is not uncommon, the Q1.(b)(iii) requirements are clear, specifically referring to ‘used for any non-agricultural purpose’ (my underlining). I have no evidence that the parking of domestic vehicles and a horsebox was for an agricultural purpose, particularly given that there is no dispute that the active use of the appeal building for agricultural purposes ceased in 2014. It follows that due to the use as outlined above for a non-agricultural purpose, the requirements of Q1.(b)(iii) are failed even if there was not a material change of use.

My attention is also drawn to other appeal decisions where Inspectors have considered temporary or intermittent uses. In relation to 3198348, this appeal was determined on the basis of an earlier version of the GPDO which required differing considerations as to if the site was not used solely for an agricultural use as part of an established agricultural unit on the relevant date. This materially differs to the specific wording and requirements of Q1.(b)(iii).

In relation to 3364163 and 3280896, the Inspectors considered whether the buildings and land were used for the purposes of an agricultural trade or business on the relevant date, as required by Q1.(a) as it were at the time of the appeals. This again differs from the requirements of Q1.(b)(iii). These factors therefore limits the equivalence of the other cases to the current proposal.

To conclude, the substantive evidence before me indicates that appeal site has been used for a non-agricultural purpose since ceasing to be part of an established agricultural unit. It follows that the proposal would not constitute permitted development as set out under Schedule 2, Part 3, Class Q of the GPDO.

For the reasons given above, the appeal is dismissed